Fidesz and Democratic Backslide in Hungary

Hungary’s 2014 Elections

Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party has again won the parliamentary elections conducted this Sunday, April 06, 2014. While many in Hungary applaud the outcome, many outsiders are nervous concerning this development. Orban’s previous administration raised many concerns amongst the international community. To understand why the Hungarian elections are newsworthy, and to understand these concerns, it is necessary to look back to Orban’s previous administration during the years 2010 – 2014, after winning a supermajority in parliament in the 2010 elections. This is the topic of examination addressed below.

Landslide in 2010

In the Hungarian Parliamentary elections of 2010, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won in a landslide, capturing over two-thirds of the seats in the chamber. There are many reasons for this. First, the opposition party, the Socialists, had emerged from the past two terms of government (2002-2010) with innumerable problems. This administration witnessed rampant corruption, ballooning deficits, and subordination of national interest to multinational corporations, among other problems. There is also, of course, the scandal of 2006 when the Socialist prime minister admitted that his party lied to the electorate concerning the country’s financial situation to win the election. In short, by 2010 popular approval for the party had hit an all-time low, and the Socialists barely managed to capture 19% of the popular vote in 2010. Building upon the frustrations with the previous administration, Fidesz offered major reform, a return to nationalist pride in the face of European integration and multinational corporations, and promises to purge the government of corruption. Above all, the party promised to complete the task of lustration (purging former communists from government positions). All of these issues struck a chord with the populace, which, combined with the dismal state of the opposition, brought about such a landslide victory. After victory, Fidesz shored up support with actions in keeping with electoral promises (and populist strategies) such as promoting nationalism by introducing a higher tax on foreign corporations, cutting the price of utilities, taking a Eurosceptic approach towards the European Union, nationalizing pensions and promising a stronger welfare state, and descrying the loss of Hungarian territory which occurred following World War I. The Fidesz party capitalized on the unpopularity of the Socialists and promoted ideals in opposition to the Socialist agenda. It is with this initial wave of support following the elections (known as ‘initial political capital’) that Orban’s Fidesz party introduced the landmark Basic Law of Hungary as well as new laws concerning the media, meant to insulate the party’s hold on power in the nation.

Constructing a New Constitution

Riding high on a wave of populist support, Fidesz, from mid-2010 to 2011 introduced a series of new legislation which run counter to traditional Western liberal ideals of government. Its two-thirds majority allowed the party to enact, to be blunt, any legislation it wished without the consultation of any opposition party. The party’s leaders immediately began work on a new constitution for the nation. If this seems an extreme first step, it is because it is necessary to view it in context. Prior to 2010, Hungary had been using the constitution of 1989 which immediately followed the collapse of communism. The drafters of that constitution envisioned that a more inclusive constitution would be drafted in later years, allowing for a two-thirds majority of parliamentary members to create a new constitution. Instead, owing to the extremely contentious nature of Hungarian party politics, no constitution was created; instead, the 1989 constitution was amended, interpreted by the Constitutional Court, and, in sum, was merely the source of a large body of legal interpretation and precedent. As Hungary modernized, and particularly after joining the European Union, it became clear that a new, proper constitution should be created, yet the fractious parties in Hungarian government were never able to work together to create one. Having won the required two-thirds majority, the first step that Fidesz took was to begin drafting a new constitution for Hungary, known as the Basic Law of Hungary. This was done without consultation with the opposition Socialist party, as remarked upon by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission when reviewing the draft in early 2010. In the process the party promised a strong welfare state based on ethnic heritage and the conclusion of the lustration process (purging government of lingering communist influences), allowing them by and large to carry out their work unimpeded.

The Basic Law of Hungary and the Press and Media Act

The result of this process was the Basic Law of Hungary, acting as the new constitution, which became effective as of January 2012. Even before its completion, it faced intense criticisms from civil liberties activists and international non-governmental agencies including the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. An opinion on the Basic Law was published by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, three months after its first, at the request of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). This is because the Basic Law, in combination with the Press and Media Act which quickly followed, puts in place several institutions and procedures that are not in keeping with Western liberal standards of government. Its preamble, to begin with, has clear and definitive ethnic overtones, in keeping with the party’s populist strategies. In keeping with this mindset, the Basic Law extends voting rights to ethnic Hungarians living in other nations, such as Slovakia and Romania, in territory that was Hungarian prior to WWI. This plays well with the nationalistic electoral support base of the party, but this is only the first issue.

In combination with the Press and Media Act, several changes were made regarding media distribution and censorship. All media regulation became subsumed under a single organization, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, composed of a presidency, a Media Council, and an Office of the Authority. The president of the authority also acts as the chair of the media council, effectively placing all media regulation functions in the hands of a single individual, to be appointed by Parliament for a term of 9 years. Under the rules of the Authority, all media outlets must be registered within 90 days of commencing operations. This registration can be revoked at any time on the basis of (vaguely worded) “repeated severe violation of the law” or a “gross breach of obligations.” These outlets, in order to retain their registration, must also, per law, provide “objective and balanced coverage” (to be defined, of course, by the Media Council). Decisions of the National Media Authority cannot be appealed and overridden, and, in addition to the power of revoking an outlet’s registration, the Authority may impose fines up to 166,000 euro per offense. Public broadcasting is likewise brought under the control of a single government agency, the Public Service Foundation. While its members are elected by Parliament, the chair of the Foundation is directly appointed by the Media Council for a term of 9 years. The Media Council likewise appoints the Board of Trustees of the Public Service Foundation, and all executives of the public broadcasting companies are appointed in fact by the President of the Media Authority. In so doing, the Fidesz government repealed laws prohibiting media monopoly, which were formerly enshrined in the Constitution, without replacing them, so as to leave the Constitutional Court without the means to challenge the new organizational structure. In essence, what Fidesz created a single authority, to wit, the President of the Media and Infocommunications Authority, who is appointed by the prime minister for a term of 9 years (indefinitely renewable), in whom is vested all ultimate authority over all the media outlets in the country. This creates a situation in which the Fidesz government, through power of appointment, has ultimate control over all media information being broadcast to the public.

After consolidating the media, Fidesz turned to the courts. The Constitutional Court of Hungary is well-known, even by the standards of Eastern European nations, as a major actor in political affairs. It is upon the basis of Constitutional Court decisions that much of government functioned prior to 2010, lacking clear guidance from the 1989 constitution. Fidesz increased the number of Constitutional Court members from 11 to 15, allowing it to appoint four new members of their choosing. It also made extensive use of so-called “Cardinal Acts,” acts of legislation requiring a two-thirds majority to pass or repeal, to keep many important issues out of the constitution and thus out of reach of the Constitutional Court. Examples include laws governing management of national assets, taxation, the pension system, rules on eligibility to run for office, rules for the rights of diverse nationalities, and rules concerning the reform and creation of national regulatory agencies, among others. Most importantly, the Fidesz government enshrined the powers of the Constitutional Court in a Cardinal Act rather than in the Basic Law, meaning, in effect, that the Court cannot defend its power to review any legislation based upon the rights granted it because it has only the power to review legislation on the basis of the Basic Law. In other words, the Constitutional Court has been effectively stripped of most of its former powers and has no right to appeal this change.

The Supreme Court was renamed the Curia in the Basic Law, allowing for a new (9 year) appointment of the President of the Curia by the ruling Fidesz government. Likewise, the Chief Prosecutor as a position was established as the Supreme Prosecutor, together with a new (9 year) appointment. Beyond this, the retirement age for prosecutors and judges was lowered from 70 to 62, allowing for a wave of new appointments to be made in the course of the four-year administration.

Finally, the ‘power of the purse,’ power over the central bank, was vested in a Budget Council, with its president appointed by the prime minister. The President of the Budget Council provides all final approval to the state budget. This, of course, was set in place by Cardinal Act rather than constitutionally. Further, Fidesz waived the right of the Constitutional Court to examine the budget if the nation’s debt exceeds 50% of its GDP (as of the law’s inception, debt was 80% of GDP). These measures were justified on the pretense of keeping the deficit within the levels required for European Union accession.

In sum, the Basic Law of Hungary, together with the Press and Media Act, delegated broad authority to democratically unaccountable agencies, staffed with appointed officials with long terms of office, introduced broad state censorship powers without the right of appeal, delegated the ‘power of the purse’ to a democratically unaccountable agency in the Budget Council with no chance of oversight in the near future, interred control over the judiciary in the form of one (appointed) official, the President of the Curia, and left many areas of the law purposefully vague and subject to the interpretation of those officials appointed by Fidesz’s majority government. It is not surprising, then, that many in Europe saw this as a step backward for democracy in Hungary, and both the Basic Law and the Press and Media Act have come under intense criticism.

To date, however, objections by civil society organizations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe have largely been ignored. The International Monetary Fund, while concerned about the institution of the Budget Council, did not withdraw financial aid. The European Union, while it entered suit regarding the Budget Council and in reference to Freedom of Information legislation, has largely remained silent on the issue. Even if there were the political will within the European Commission, Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union precludes it from interfering with national governments unless it is in the act of implementing European Union legislation. Arguments that Hungary no longer meets the “Copenhagen Criteria” for membership are difficult to sustain, and even less likely to be the basis of any European Union action. The democratic backslide of Hungary cannot (and will not) be reversed by external factors alone.

Conclusion

The measures taken in the drafting of the Basic Law of Hungary and the Press and Media Act, which still stand largely intact, are moving the country towards a brand of one-party rule. The Council of Europe, the OSCE, the European Union, and even the International Monetary Fund appear helpless to reverse these trends. The Fidesz government, using traditional populist strategies, has consolidated all branches of government for complete domination. Most of the reforms introduced during the first administration remain standing, and old-fashioned gerrymandering (combined with a reduction in the number of Members of Parliament) further cements the party’s power. The legal changes will require another two-thirds majority for their repeal, unlikely given the extremely partisan nature of Hungarian politics. With the success of Fidesz in the recent election, these changes are likely to become even more entrenched, and the situation becomes even more worrying. It may not be too drastic to say that Hungary is experiencing a democratic backslide, and the possibility of one-party rule looms large. This is a real and tangible issue that confronts both Europe and the world beyond it.

France: Front National

Although many find the ideology of the Front National to be outside the limits of a liberal society, they have achieved resounding success in recent elections

Last week, on 23 March, 2014, the extreme-right Front National party in France put forward its strongest showing in local elections in recent years. Although it only contested in 600 out of 3,600 constituencies, it won over 7% of the popular vote. The party’s leader, Marine Le Pen, said the showings established the party as a political force at both the national and local level. Although in reality it has been such for a long time, the opportunity for publicity both shows and increases the strength of the party, reassuring its status as the ‘third party’ of French politics. The reason this is worrying, and the reason that it is news, is that the Front National is by all measures a party of the extreme-right. It has a revolutionary ideology which calls for the overthrow of the Fifth Republic, the concentration of political power in the executive branch, open racial discrimination combined with welfare state policies (i.e., national-socialism), a complete and unconditional withdrawal from the European Union, and national isolation. Although its messages may be tempered at various times and in various places to increase its electoral appeal, these are the longstanding bases of its party ideology. And although many in France find its message to be outside the limits of acceptable political discourse (the current prime minister is quoted as saying on national television that “wherever the Front National is in a position to win the second [final] round, all who support democracy and the republic have a duty to prevent them”), the party has a significant base of loyal voters that it has gained and kept over the past 30 years. This article will examine its origins and development that has allowed such a radical party to become the ‘third party’ of French politics.

Origins and Ideology

The origins of the Front National are deeply steeped in the tradition of extreme-right politics in France. Arising out of the Nouvelle Droite (New Right), which was composed of political activists from Vichy apologists, to neo-fascists, pied-noirs (former French colonists in Algeria), and monarchists, the Front National was created in 1972 to unite all the various factions of the extreme-right together to achieve greater electoral victories. This was a novel idea, as many previous political movements of the far-right rejected democratic parliamentary politics. The Front National was, and continues to be, for all intents and purposes a radical party. Although the party obviously needed to temper its anti-parliamentarism to carry out its purpose in gaining representation, a rejection of the Fifth Republic has always remained an important component of its official ideology. Its leader for many years, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has repeatedly called for the foundation of a ‘Sixth Republic,’ which would be based on a powerful executive, discrimination against peoples not of French ethnic origin, and the establishment of a police state. Apart from this, the Front National calls for a complete withdrawal from the European Union, the establishment of a welfare state confined to ethnic French citizens (national-socialism), a rejection of the global market, and isolation and insulation from cosmopolitanism. The Front National believes, as a central tenet of its ideology, in the fundamental inequality of peoples (much as with most far-right parties in Europe). Le Pen is quoting as saying that “in the temperate climates of Europe, intelligence has developed at the expense of unlimited sexuality, thus determining the superiority of Europe.” Finally, the party is a revolutionary party in believing that it should serve as a vanguard of a revolution to overthrow the Fifth Republic.

Early Electoral History

At first, the Front National performed miserably by electoral standards. Many in the far-right political movements of the 70’s rejected participation in the parliamentary system, and instead opted to support traditional militant activist groups. Given the scope of ideologies the Front National was seeking to represent, it was in need of a unifying political issue that across all the various factions of the extreme-right. In the past, this has been the only way for the extreme-right to gain any political success. In the years immediately following WWII, it was Nazi sympathy and nostalgia for the Vichy regime, in the 1950’s the Indo-China War, and in the early 1960’s it was the Algerian War. By the early 70’s, with decolonization already accomplished, the only such issue that appealed to all members of the far-right was anti-communism. However, the mainstream right party of the day was already staunchly anti-communist, and as the 70’s wore on and the USSR began to show cracks the communist threat was already receding as a political issue. The Front National would eventually find its unifying issue in immigration at the end of the 1970’s, but before it could effectively exploit this issue the party dynamics of the country had to change. This would come with the fall of the Communist Party (Parti Communiste Française).

Electoral Breakthrough and Consolidation (1979-1988)

The French Communist Party had been steadily losing support during the Brezhnev years in the USSR, when the fundamental flaws in the state-owned economic system were becoming apparent. The Communists lacked the ability to attract new voters, satisfy its traditional working-class political base on important political issues, and maintain party loyalty. Grasping for a new unifying issue, it was the Communists, whose traditional bases of support came from the working class of the inner cities, who first exploited non-European immigration in its political platform. Taking a cue, the Front National also exploited this issue, with its support base in largely the same demographic groups and geographic locations. However, it was unsuccessful at first, as it were losing in competition with the Communist Party. In 1981, the Front National won only 0.3% of the national popular vote. However, as the 1980’s progressed, several important shifts occurred across the French political landscape. First, as already noted, the Communist Party largely collapsed as a political force. Second, during the early 80’s there was a growing pattern of defection from the mainstream parties, which the Front National benefited from by attracting these voters (as well as first-time voters who likewise opted out of the mainstream). Third, immigration was steadily increasing, and whereas it had in earlier years largely been migrant workers coming into the country, after the ban on such immigration the dynamic shifted to family unification, and it became clear that the migrants did not intend to leave. They concentrated in the same working-class districts where the Communists and the Front National found their electoral support base, allowing the FN to effectively exploit an issue which many felt was being neglected by the mainstream parties. The party’s percentage of the popular national vote went from 0.3% in 1981 to 10.9% in 1984, only 0.3% behind the Communist Party. It attracted 48% of voters who claimed immigration as their number one issue in the elections. In the following years the party proved to be extremely successful in maintaining voter loyalty, as well as attracting new and defecting voters. Le Pen was added to the list of presidential candidates from 1984 until 2008, after which he was succeeded by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. In 1988 Le Pen won 14.4% of the first round of presidential elections. When the wall fell, globalization ensued, and European countries were drafting the revolutionary Maastricht Treaty which would create the European Union that we know today, the appeal of the party for those who felt threatened and disenfranchised by these developments exploded. Like all far-right parties in Europe, the Front National capitalized on fear and anger to consolidate its success.

Forcing Compromise (1988-2012)

After the first headscarf debate in 1989 (in which Muslim students were expelled for wearing headscarves), the mainstream party of the right (Jacques Chirac’s Rassemblement pour la Republic, or RPR) took a radical turn on immigration, in part responding to the electoral success of the Front National which came largely at their expense. Le Pen responded in turn, and his party was able to hold its ground, enjoying 38% national approval for its stance on immigration in 1991. With the collapse of communism, hitherto a main rallying point for the right-wing, and the establishment of the Schengen Agreement allowing visa-free travel within the European Union, immigration had become all the more important. The Front National additionally began to challenge the European integration process which allowed for freedom of movement and porous borders (along with, according to Le Pen, a deterioration of national values), a maneuver which met with great success. Jacques Chirac’s mainstream right-wing RPR/UDF coalition continued to attempt to co-opt the Front National on its main issues, shifting the entire political landscape of the country towards the right. In 2002, however, the success of the Front National became shockingly apparent. Le Pen beat the center-left candidate in the first round of presidential elections, leaving himself contending directly with Jacques Chirac for the presidency. The nation was faced with an anti-Semitic, revolutionary, borderline neo-fascist presidential candidate in the final round, who still won nearly 18% of the popular vote. It was after this election that the career of former president Nicolas Sarkozy began, as interior minister and a staunch anti-immigration figure himself. During the 2000’s, a resurgence of the left-wing and the campaign strategies of Nicolas Sarkozy served to restrain the Front National’s growth, at least until the Eurozone crisis again stirred up popular fears and national protectionism. The Front National won 9.4% of the popular vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections, down from 2002 but still enough to maintain its status as the second party of the right-wing. After this, Jean-Marie Le Pen was succeeded as leader of the party by his daughter, Marine Le Pen, who made a presidential run in 2012, winning 18% in the first round.

The Front National Today

The reason why there is such concern with the Front National’s recent electoral success is that it retains ethnic discrimination, withdrawal from the European Union, and the establishment of a police state as central tenets of its political platform. Although many in France find its ideologies outside the limits of acceptable political discourse, the party has retained the loyalty of many voters and continues to attract new ones. In Europe, many other far-right parties with similar views look upon France’s Front National as a success story to be emulated. To date there is no reason to believe its influence will decline; indeed, all the factors are present to further its success – dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, an anti-establishment attitude among youth voters, economic recession, continued Islamaphobia, rejection of globalization, the erosion of the welfare state, and talk of further European integration. All of these provide fertile ground for every far-right party in Europe, yet the Front National has an established and reliable base of support upon which to build further electoral success. Marine Le Pen has been largely accepted as leader of the party in place of her father, and loyalty to the party remains high. Although the Front National may not (yet) have militias in the streets like the far-right parties of Eastern Europe, it may be argued that its position in mainstream politics makes it a more tangible threat. In coming years, it will continue to be important to watch (and guard against) the Front National in France.

 

The US and the EU: The Need for a United Front Against Russia

Transatlantic Tensions
“F**k the EU.” This is what Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland (the highest ranking diplomat in European relations) supposedly was overheard saying to the Ukrainian ambassador this February, while she was in a discussion concerning who should be the new head of state in Ukraine (representing another nasty little tendency of the American government). Ever since the resignation of Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright, transatlantic relations have grown tense. A brief period of solidarity after September 11 was quickly broken by disagreements over the war in Iraq, a wound which has never fully healed. It is not necessary to describe former president G.W. Bush’s attitude towards the EU, and really Europe in general. The Bush administration was a model of all the negative traits of US imperialist foreign policy. With the election of President Obama, who emphasized the need for multilateralism in international politics, many European and EU officials hoped that the process would be reversed and the transatlantic partnership infused with new blood. Such hopes have long since been dashed. Many officials have informally recounted how the president dislikes meeting with the officials in Brussels, having skipped the EU capital during his last four visits to Europe, and the turn towards a Pacific-based foreign policy has left many European leaders feeling that the US simply does not care about Europe anymore. They’re not far off, really. The president has officially stated on a number of occasions the need to shift foreign policy focus to China and the Pacific Rim. In the leadership vacuum left in Europe by US foreign policy, Germany has appeared to emerge as the new agenda-setter, even though this does not go over well in many member-states of the EU. It is doubtful that the transatlantic partnership will ever regain the importance it held during the Cold War era, and this is something that European officials will have to get used to. However, America still needs Europe, just as Europe needs America. The EU bloc is America’s largest trading partner, and consists of its strongest and most dependable strategic allies. The tensions, though they will probably never be resolved in the foreseeable future, need to be addressed by officials on both sides of the Atlantic.
Why America Needs the EU in the Ukrainian Crisis
Let us count the ways. To begin with, was it not a deal proposed by the European Union, rejected by then-president Yanukovych, that started the entire Euromaidan protest movement in the first place? Ukraine sees the EU as a more available and more responsive entity than the United States, and while anti-Americanism runs strong throughout the nation, the EU is much more well-regarded. The pro-Western elites, groups, and peoples of Ukraine see accession to the European Union as the ultimate goal of their country – one which will bring security, stability, and economic prosperity. Further, Ukrainians remember well the efforts put into rebuilding the former Warsaw Pact nations by the European Union officials at the time, where the United States was notably absent. Ambitions to join NATO are much less pronounced, and the US has never offered any substantial trade deals to the nation. In fact, it has hardly taken notice of the country until the escalation of violence in Kiev this January.
But now, one may say, a new government is in Kiev. The trade deal, and then some, has already been committed to by the EU. Now there is Crimea to worry about. And what exactly will the European Union, the same EU that seemed so helpless in the Yugoslavian disaster of the 1990’s, do about it? This is a valid question, yet it can still be answered without changing the premise of this article. However, we must break the responses up into several key points.
First: the military threat. Is it not, one may ask, that Russia is sending massive amounts of troops near the border with eastern Ukraine? And does it not remain the fact that NATO is, essentially, the US army with some scattered and very limited support from a smattering of allies? Thus, is it not the United States, and not the European Union, that will have to face any military threat coming from Russia? This is indeed true (and American officials have for years expressed frustration with Europe’s lack of contribution to the alliance). It is mainly US forces conducting exercises in Bulgaria and the Black Sea and sending air support to Poland and the Baltic States. This show of strength is doubtless important to limit the effect on Putin’s popularity created by his military buildup. But, while the future is unpredictable, it is an extremely unlikely scenario in which the first confrontation between NATO and Russia will occur over the Ukraine. It is also unlikely that Russia will actually invade eastern Ukraine – as I have stated in an earlier article, it is one thing to absorb a territory which has openly expressed its desire to join with the Russian Federation through referendum (whether legal or illegal under international law, it still retains trappings of democracy). It is quite another to militarily invade a portion of Ukraine which has expressed no such overwhelming desire, where many Ukrainians, while favoring close ties to Moscow, retain their national identities, and where even violent protests have seemed to have failed to bring about a change of heart for many eastern Ukrainians.
And what of Transnistria (Trans-Dniester), the breakaway province in Moldova? Two questions: first, is the Russian army really going to violate the sovereign territory of Ukraine to reach that destination? And second, why does the Russian army need to invade this region when nearly 1,000 Russian ‘peacekeepers’ are already stationed there, and have been for some time? This is merely one analyst’s opinion, but I believe that the military threat is being grossly exaggerated, and that Putin’s military buildup is more of a publicity stunt than anything else. And, without a military threat, you do not need NATO and the backing of the United States. NATO will most likely play the same role it has since the end of the Cold War: a symbolic one.
Second, the economic sanctions. The main claim of US officials is that, while the EU is targeting individuals, the US is going after large assets like the Bank Russiya. And that is certainly helpful. But, much like any wealthy American businessman, Russian economic elites are savvy enough to shelter their wealth elsewhere (primarily in Cyprus, a notorious tax haven for Russians, which just so happens to be in the European Union). The EU is targeting individuals who shelter their wealth in European micro-states, who educate their children in Britain, who vacation in Monte Carlo and the French Riviera, and who invest in Eastern Europe. It may be argued that the EU sanctions have a greater possibility of impacting the elites of the Putin administration than the Americans’. At the very least, it cannot be said, as some US officials have, that the EU sanctions are ‘worthless.’
This initial round of sanctions will necessarily need to be followed by further economic sanctions, as Russia is not now nor ever has been swayed by arguments based upon international law. Russia functions under a ‘realist’ vision of politics, where state power, and its constant increase, is the primary measure of success in geopolitics. In producing further sanctions, the role of the European Union will be indispensable.

Consider the facts. In the year 2012, Russia traded 287.5b euro worth of commodities to the EU bloc, compared to 18.8b euro worth to the United States (representing just over 7% of Russia’s trade with the EU). Beyond this, the EU bloc represents the number one market for Russian energy exports, which, as is common knowledge, is the blood in Russia’s veins. Russia prefers to, and in this instance will probably try to, negotiate deals with individual member-states to help get around EU-level sanctions. However, over the years the officials in Brussels have achieved considerable control over the macroeconomic mechanisms of its member states. It sets tariff rates for all commodities imported into or exported from EU member-states. It sets rules and regulations, often quite stringent, on the kinds of commodities, and in what quantities, can be imported into the bloc. It has the power to create (or restrict) official subsidies to corporations, including those founded by foreign direct investment. And, of course, it sets the monetary exchange between the euro and all other internationally traded currencies, including the ruble. Should the officials in Brussels be so inclined, they have the power to enact significant sanctions against Russia that will effectively and directly hit an economy that is already purportedly slipping into recession.
A United Front
The problem with this reasoning is, though, that if the European Union enacts sanctions that are too stringent, it will amount to a Pyrrhic victory. The Eurozone itself is still suffering a severe recession, unemployment remains high, GDP production is slow, and, frankly, any measures that would affect the Eurozone economy too harshly will end disastrously. Hence the cautious course taken by diplomats in Brussels, targeting individuals in Russia’s inner circle rather than the economy from which they derive their wealth. It is here that the United States must re-enter the discussion. Although the US economy has clearly not recovered either, it is certainly stronger than Europe’s. In addition, as previously noted, the United States does not have nearly as close a connection to the Russian economy as the EU. If the US is really serious about economic sanctions that will reverse the trajectory Russia seems to be on, what is needed is a reconsideration of trade negotiations with the EU bloc, negotiations that will be more favorable to the European economies to alleviate some of the effects that decreased trade with Russia will create. If the US is serious about confronting Russia, than it needs to take the EU seriously, and it needs to support and encourage its transatlantic ally in taking difficult and unpopular measures. The transatlantic relationship must come center stage in any discussion about confronting Russia, and not just for photo-ops. If the US and the EU are both serious about the Crimea issue, then both need to take each other seriously, and rely on the longstanding partnership whose sole raison d’être for nearly 50 years was restraining Russian imperialism. Neither can solve this problem alone.

After Crimea, What’s Next?

Sunset on Crimea

On March 18th, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill into law formally annexing the territory of Crimea, a southern peninsula of Ukraine, incorporating it officially into the Russian Federation. The move has been described as illegal under international law by Ukraine and a number of Western countries as well as the European Union as a collective entity. However, legal contestation does not change the facts on the ground. As of yesterday, every military base in Crimea was under Russian occupation, and the central government in Kiev has ordered the immediate evacuation of all Ukrainian troops. The status of the maneuver will likely be debated long after its actual incorporation into Russia, but the questions today primarily concern how effective counter-measures may be imposed, and what Russia will do next.
Sanctions
The most basic strategic tool used in legal battles over international law, sanctions, have already been employed by Western nations. Some major sanctions have been put into effect, including those targeting Bank Rossiya (the Kremlin’s favored bank) and Russia’s exclusion from the G-8 summit, but for the most part they have been targeted against individuals among Putin’s inner circle. At last count, the United States had imposed sanctions, including travel restrictions and asset freezes, against 27 individuals; the European Union has targeted 33. These individuals comprise Putin’s inner circle, including his Chief of Staff, the mastermind of Putin’s model of ‘managed democracy,’ business partners, and childhood friends. The strategy behind such sanctions is widely recognized in political studies: through targeting individuals surrounding an authoritarian leader (as Putin can at this point be safely called), the hope is to trigger ‘elite defection,’ with their inner circle withdrawing their necessary support as it no longer suits their interests. However, these sanctions will not be nearly enough to trigger such an occurrence. What is more, Putin has a fairly legitimate base of popular support to rely upon in any event, which increases with each imperial maneuver such as the one under discussion here. Western economic sanctions will, in fact, never go far enough to have much of a restraining effect on Russian geopolitical ambitions. Russia is the European Union’s largest trading partner, is slated by the IMF to represent the 7th largest gross national producer (GNP) by 2015 (just below France and the UK), and the global economy is already feeling the effects, beginning with a sharp rise in oil prices last week. Further, it may be argued that the West cannot present a united front: the European Union trades as a collective entity, and US President Barack Obama has all but avoided dealing with any EU officials even on this matter. And there are always other markets, such as China, who are less concerned with a state’s status under international law than what they have to offer. There is also the little inconvenient problem of Ukraine’s gross amount of debt to the Russian Federation, unlikely to decrease as a factor even with an influx of foreign aid. In short, sanctions, while they certainly send a clear diplomatic message, are not likely to have any geopolitical impact.
Military Drills
To bolster what should only assumed to be diplomatic messages, NATO forces have been active on their eastern borders in response to an intense buildup of Russian forces by the eastern Ukrainian border. A fleet of F-16 fighter jets have been deployed to Poland, spy plane activities have increased, and air support has been provided in the Baltic States as well. NATO has been conducting military drills both in Bulgaria and in the Black Sea in a symbolic gesture. None of this should be taken too seriously: there is virtually no possibility of US ‘boots on the ground’ in the Ukraine and, unfortunately, the nation is simply not strategic enough to trigger any significant military confrontation. On the alternate side, however, the Russian buildup near the eastern Ukrainian border should likewise be seen as a demonstration of forces, a flexing of muscles as it were. There is nothing to suggest a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, as some reporters have suggested. One must remember both that Crimea passed an overwhelming referendum prior to the Russian annexation, and that the Russians already had a substantial military force operating in the peninsula under a treaty giving them access to Black Sea ports and naval bases that has been in force since the 90’s.
The Russian Reaction
The Crimea incident has already spurred copycat protests in eastern Ukraine, and new fears are developing that Russia will attempt to occupy the Transnistria (also known as Trans-Dniester) region of Moldova, a breakaway province that has desired unification with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. As to the former, most eastern Ukrainians, although they feel an ethnic identification with the Russian heritage, do not seem to favor political unification. These are not Russians living abroad, as in Crimea, but national Ukrainians, many of whom value their national identity. As to the latter, it should be recognized that, after a series of conflicts in the Transnistria region, Russian ‘peacekeepers’ have been de facto occupying the territory for many years, which has its own government, insignia, and militia (as well as language dialect). Were Russia to formally occupy Transnistria, the occasion would have relatively little political impact apart from increasing Putin’s popularity at home. Of course, this is exactly the reason why such an occurrence should not be ruled out. After an amazing economic expansion in the 2000’s, the Russian economy is slowing down – in its fourth year of decline (with a growth of 1.3-1.5% of GDP – 3% is considered a stable and healthy growth rate). There is talk of a recession within the country. Political dissent is on the increase, occasioning extreme reprisals from the state authorities. Putin needs to bolster his political position at home, even at the expense of weakening it abroad. However, his recent imperialist actions and rhetoric have won great popularity in a nation still largely resenting the loss of world power occasioned by the collapse of the USSR – a recent poll suggested that more Russians than in the past 15 years believe that “Russia is a great power,” the figure standing at roughly 63%. Further, the Crimea situation has found popular favor, with roughly 95% of Russians (according to one poll) favoring “support of ethnic Russians living in Crimea,” from which it is not difficult to draw a justification for annexation in a majority-Russian territory. In reality, the Russian play is no different than it has been for centuries: in times of domestic troubles, imperialist ventures abroad draw attention away and reinforce the existing regime. This was true under the Romanovs, it was true under the USSR, and it has been true since the 1990’s (see Russia’s support in the Yugoslav breakup or its establishment of essentially protectorates in Georgia in 2008). It is a tried and true method, and for a Soviet-reminiscent strongman such as Putin it would be counterintuitive to expect any less. And it seems to be working, at least for the time being. This leaves commentators with the question, what steps will Russia take next?
Putin’s Strategy
Following the annexation, President Putin made a formal address to the state assembly. He put the annexation of Crimea into terms of a ‘reunification’ with Russia, a correction of a historical injustice that he described as a cheap power play by former Premier Nikita Khrushchev in a move that was unconstitutional even under Soviet standards. He played upon the issues with the Kiev government and how it was unfit to govern the peninsula, focusing on corruption and the official reduction of the Russian language to explain the increasing alienation of Crimea from the mainland. He compared the referendum to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, declared legal by the UN’s International Court of Justice, despite the complete absence of discrimination against Russians in Crimea and the existence of an extensive network of laws, rules, and regulations to guarantee the essential political autonomy of the region under the Kiev government (all contrary to the factors upon which the ICJ ruled Kosovo’s declaration legal under international law). He even compared the annexation to the reunification of East and West Germany (despite the fact that only 66% of Crimeans are ethnically Russian). Overall, however, he played upon the incompetence and possible illegality of the interim government of Ukraine, giving the impression that the people of Crimea were now in better hands. He stated in his address that: “it is obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the imposters, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.” Vladimir Putin is thus following the grand tradition of imperialist political theatre in every sense of the word.
What Next?
To begin with, eastern Ukrainians have little to fear (or hope for) despite Russia’s buildup along the border. It is one thing to accept an overwhelming referendum as grounds for annexation, quite another to militarily invade a sovereign nation where no such vote has occurred (nor is it likely to). The military buildup is most likely just a flex of strength, a compliment to the imperialist tactics Putin is employing, to bolster support at home. Further, eastern Ukraine does not have anywhere near the military and economic strategic significance of the Crimean peninsula, which has been battled over for centuries. It is true we are likely to see more pro-Russian protests in Ukraine, perhaps violent ones, but probably not serious enough to completely reverse the results of the revolution in Kiev. As for Transnistria, therein lies a different scenario. It is possible that Putin would consider sending troops or escalating diplomatic talks with this breakaway province, riding out an approval rating high starting with Sochi and continued through Crimea, to detract from looming domestic problems. Yet again, this would be an event of relatively little geopolitical significance. Transnistria already functions in practical way independently of its host country of Moldova, which is not a NATO ally (and has little chance of being one) and is in no way strategically important. Even were a Russian occupation to take place, it would change very little on the ground. Most likely, what comes next is a battle of rhetoric, a legal battle in which Putin will attempt by any means (including referencing the United States’ own violations of international law) to defend his decisions in the international community, perhaps loosing European Union sanctions, and an economic battle with the West that is sure to affect both sides in a negative way. This commentator can only make limited predictions. But, most likely, the bloodless invasion of Crimea marks the high point of the Russian geopolitical drama for the moment. We should be focused on Crimea, and on the effect it will have on the still fragile interim government of Ukraine, above all other things.

On The Scottish Independence Referendum

Overview

On September 18, 2014, every eligible voter born in Scotland will be faced with a referendum which will ask the question: “Should Scotland be an independent nation?” The question has been heavily debated over nearly the past two decades, as Scotland has gradually attained greater regional autonomy and devolution from the rest of the United Kingdom. The final agreement to hold such a referendum came after an overwhelming victory of the Scottish National Party (as the name suggests, a heavily nationalist political organization) in 2011. The party, led by Alex Salmond, was the first party in the regional Scottish parliament to win an overall majority, capturing 45% of the seats, which represented an increase of 13% over the results of the 2007 elections. According to recent polls, the Scottish National Party won the highest approval rating of any political party in the regional parliament, and its leader, Alex Salmond, likewise captured the highest approval of any party leader. However, it is unlikely that the referendum will pass: recent polls show that only 30-39% of Scots favor complete independence from the United Kingdom. However, ever greater devolution from the UK polled considerably higher, at around 70%. Should the referendum fail, Mr. Salmond has promised it will not be repeated: he has described it as a ‘once in a lifetime event.’ The goal is to avoid the creation of a “neverendum” such as exists in Quebec in Canada, where such referendums are held repeatedly every few years. Therefore, there is a fair amount of significance attached to this event.

History

Calls for Scotland’s disunion from the UK have existed practically since the union of the two nations in 1707. In 1745, the so-called Jacobite rebellion, premised upon Scottish nationalism, unfolded as a Catholic pretender to the British throne attempted to lead a rebellion to gain control of the union. However, for much of its history thereafter, there have been few attempts at disunion. The Jacobite tradition was carried onwards largely in a ceremonial fashion, to celebrate a distinct cultural identity and history. The traditions of kilts, bagpipes, and highland games were largely reinvented in and by the romantic Victorian era. Through the 20^th century, Scotland has a history of traditionally favoring welfare state values, reflected in the traditional success of leftist political parties. In 1979, in a political maneuver by the Labour party, which has always enjoyed strong support among Scots, a post-legislative referendum was held on the Scotland Act of 1978 promoting greater autonomy. After the failure of this movement, a second referendum, largely supported by the new Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, was held pre-legislatively in 1997, leading to the Scotland Act of 1998 and the creation of a Scottish parliament and executive in 2009. The Scottish National Party quickly became the second largest party in the assembly, to serve two terms as the main opposition party, and then to win a majority, forming a minority government, in 2007. The Scottish Executive was rebranded the Scottish Government by the SNP, and further devolution and possible independence were to increase in significance in the political discourse. In 2011 the SNP became the first party to win an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament, forming for the first time a minority government which soon promised a referendum on Scottish independence within 4 years. The issue has become a center of discourse within Scottish politics, and a date for the referendum was eventually set, after passing the legislature in November 2013, for September 18, 2014.

Ideology

Much debate about Scottish independence emphasizes the role of ideological difference in political decisions. The concept of the welfare state has remained strong in Scotland despite the shift to the right that followed Thatcher in Westminster politics and the development of neo-liberalism throughout the 90’s and 2000’s. The fundamental difference, for pro-independence idealists, and grounds for political disunion with the UK, is that Scotland is more ready to embrace a Nordic model of social democracy as opposed to the neo-liberal serving as the basis for mainstream UK politics, and ready to embrace more socially progressive policies. The difficulty for Scotland is that SNP leaders claim to want to enhance the welfare state model while still lowering corporate taxes – it is unclear how this is likely to function (such models have been tried and failed). Scotland may need more economic control than it can actually attain to make such a model work, which brings us to the implications of Scottish independence.

Implications

The factor which would be most likely to serve as a foundation of a developing independent Scottish economy would be revenue from oil deposits in the North Sea. Maintenance of this fundamental natural resource would ensure Scotland’s wealth as an independent nation. Scotland, however, would be subject to a number of constraints concerning its control of macroeconomic policy.

To begin with, it is widely accepted that an independent Scotland would become a member of the European Union, with all the trade rules and regulations that go with. In the absence of a large national production sector, and with an estimated 15% of its wealth coming from economically volatile natural resource assets, Scotland would likely follow other ‘virtual’ nations of Europe (e.g., Ireland, Belgium) in lowering corporate tax rates to attract foreign direct investment. As has been seen in the initial throws of the Eurozone crisis, such an economic foundation is tenuous at best, and what is more, it is difficult to reconcile such an economic strategy with a plan for greater socio-economic benefits under the welfare state.

Second, Scotland will not be able to meet the criteria for joining the euro, which are very strict and difficult to maintain (in fact, most Eurozone countries no longer actually meet the criteria). Seeing as how, with climbing inflation and a growing deficit, the UK only actually meets one of the criteria for joining the Euro (low interest rates), there is no reasonable belief that Scotland will be able to join the euro in the foreseeable future. This reduces it to continuing to use the pound. Yet the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, a conservative, has already announced that he will not allow Scottish influence over the pound, still leaving Scotland without any means of developing an independent monetary policy. In this sense, Scotland would likely remain somewhat beholden to the Westminster government. Such a situation may become even more complicated if Scotland moves toward the EU even as the UK is moving towards partial withdrawal from the entity. There are also practical matters to deal with, including energy subsidies (traditionally coming from the UK central bank), Scotland’s adoption of its share of the UK national debt, and a multi-billion dollar nuclear submarine fleet, Trident, stationed near Glasgow. In short, it is difficult to see how an independent Scotland would dramatically change without great difficulty.

An Independent Scotland?

It is for perhaps these reasons that more Scots are opting for further gradual devolution than for outright independence. Independence is not impossible, however, as a simple majority will decide the issue. In the coming months, the two movements, “Yes, Scotland” and “Better Together” are likely to publicize the event and forward strong arguments for both sides. The result should yet be regarded as unpredictable, and the implications could be considerable. Come September, will Scotland become the newest nation on earth? The answer to that question, and its relative geopolitical importance, is an issue to be decided by the Scots.

The Crimean Referendum, International Law, and the Role of Russia

Self-Determination under International Law

In many ways, the system of international law in use today finds its origins in the immediate post-War era of the 1950’s. It was a time of the break-up of colonial holdings of European nations and the establishment of new states in Africa and Central Asia. At that time, the principle of self-determination was understood to be a belief that the indigenous peoples of these countries should be given the privilege of self-rule, as opposed to domination by Western powers. It was in the mid-1960’s that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights were drafted, both of which included the principle of the self-determination of peoples in their first article. The original goal of this tenet was to support the process of de-colonialization. In later years, this principle of international law would be invoked by the Palestinians and South Africans, who found themselves discriminated against within the countries in which they resided.

International law, of course, always represents a grey area in international politics, as it is not so much law as it is a system of norms (commonly accepted ideas and practices regarded as appropriate). Thus, over time, there has been much debate as to precisely what the principle of self-determination entails. It has been established through many legal debates and battles that secession from states is only justified in cases in which the offending state does not provide an appropriate respect for the fundamental rights of minority peoples. Secession, indeed, is only permitted under international law if both internal self-determination (i.e., granting of limited autonomy to certain regions and peoples) is not present and there is clear evidence that blatant, widespread, and sanctioned discrimination exists which cannot be resolved through peaceful means. International law recognizes no right to secession unless such oppression of a particular class of peoples exists. Further, the International Court of Justice, in dealing with the case of Kosovo (which unilaterally seceded from Serbia in 2008), determined that a strict interpretation of repression must be met. Finally, discrimination must be based upon a people’s ethnicity, cultural heritage, linguistic unity, creed, or ideology. In historical precedent, no secession of a people has ever been recognized by the United Nations in the presence of opposition from the mother state. Thus, international law recognizes no right to secede without blatant oppression of a class of people. UN Resolution 2625, relating to this point, affirms that, although self-determination is admitted as a fundamental right of all peoples:

Nothing in [Resolution 2625] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.

In addition…

Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.

The best principle, according to UN law, for dealing with diverse minorities, is internal self-determination, in essence meaning a degree of autonomy being granted for those peoples within the confines of the existing state.

Kosovo

In the year 2008, the province of Kosovo, a territory of Serbia, unilaterally declared independence. This action was subsequently found to not have been in violation of international law by the International Court of Justice. The main reason for this is that there in fact was real and blatant discrimination against Kosovar Albanians within the confines of the Serbian state, who were denied access to basic goods and services, representation in government, and widespread discrimination in the job market for which the government in Belgrade made no attempt to rectify. In such a case, and given the situation, it was deemed impossible to resolve the situation through peaceful means, and no doubt the Kosovo situation was to an extent sui generis (unique) in that the threat of ethnic violence (poignantly recalled from the crisis of the 1990’s) constantly loomed overhead. This, however, set a precedent, perhaps justified and perhaps not, of the limits of the avenues of peaceful reconciliation. As of this moment, 108 UN member-states recognize Kosovo as an independent nation, and it is an independent member of the IMF and the World Bank, although, keeping with the tradition aforementioned, it has not been recognized by the UN due to the opposition of the Republic of Serbia, from whom it has seceded (it is also not recognized by the European Union, although Serbia’s ambitions to join the EU may be contingent on its recognition of Kosovo as an independent state). In the case of the Kosovar Albanians, however, they are clearly a distinct ethnic group, with their own cultural heritage and ethnicity, falling into line with the precedents set by international law under United Nations resolutions. Thus there is a clear and distinct ethno-cultural group blatantly discriminated against by their host state.

The Case of Crimea

The case of Crimea is vastly different than that of Kosovo. To begin with, it is a relatively heterogeneous population, consisting of 58% ethnic Russians, 24% ethnic Ukrainians, and 12% ethnic Tatars. Thus any claim to self-determination on the basis of ethnicity, shared linguistics, creeds, or cultural history is null. This in itself is enough to disqualify it from the principle of self-determination on the basis of these factors. Second, the population of Crimea is not discriminated against; in fact, it is been granted a relatively extreme measure of internal self-determination, possessing its own parliament and prime minister and the ability to create its own laws and ordinances (although subject to approval from Kiev). There is no recognizable oppression of the inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula from the central government in Kiev.  In fact, Crimea already exists as a semi-autonomous region within the nation. Finally, peaceful solutions to resolve its disputes with the government in Kiev have not been exhausted. Based upon these points, its secession, according to the currently accepted standards of international law, is invalid. Politicians from Crimea are indeed represented in the central government of Kiev, and in the current crisis, there is no evidence that a peaceful solution may not be found internally within the confines of the Ukrainian state. Were the referendum to definitively pass without objection – a highly unlikely scenario – it would not be eligible for official UN recognition on the basis of the opposition of the mother country, in addition to the fact that it likely not be recognized by the majority of the Western nations. Finally, the results of the referendum must be tempered by the fact that over 10% of the population has boycotted the vote (Crimean Tatars). In short, the US and other Western nations are perfectly justified in claiming that the referendum and its results do not comply with international law as it stands today.

It is certainly understandable why the people of Crimea, according to the 80% exit polls tabulated at the time of this writing, have revealed 93% – 95% approval of unification with Russia. Ukraine is clearly in a troubled state. Political upheaval and instability, an uncertain economic outlook, and the dominance in Kiev of a strong nationalism distasteful to many Crimean inhabitants make the prospect of remaining under the control of Kiev unfavorable. In contrast, Russia has many ‘authoritarian goods’ to offer: a prosperous economy, a stable (albeit undemocratic) political system, and the prevalence of law and order compare favorably with the state of a revolutionary and unstable Ukraine. Although many of Crimea’s inhabitants doubtless feel an ethnic connection with the Russian Federation, others may feel that it is simply a more stable nation to inhabit.  Nonetheless, the results of the referendum are likely to be opposed by Western nations, not only because they violate standards of international law, but because they run counter to their interests.

Russian Hypocrisy

Obviously the role of Russia cannot be ignored in this scenario. The Russians have been extremely vocal in their support of the right of the people of Crimea to determine their own destiny, and are supported by the results of the referendum. However, when one looks at recent history, one sees a case of blatant hypocrisy. Russia was (and is) strongly opposed to the secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia, whom it counts as an ally, without any justification in international law. To this day it refuses to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Likewise, it is vehemently opposed to the secession ambitions of Chechnya, over which it has fought several conflicts, although the majority of the Chechen separatists clearly represent a distinct cultural group with its own heritage, linguistic tradition, and creed. On the other hand, Russia has firmly supported the right of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to secede from Georgia, and indeed engaged in a conflict over the issue in 2008. It has also stationed troops in the Transnistria region of Moldova, a separatist region wishing to join the Russian Federation, under the guise of a ‘peacekeeping force’ which brings the region under de facto Russian rule. It may be argued that a similar tactic is being employed in Crimea, as (probable) Russian troops are stationed as an act of coercion for local populations resistant to Russian rule. As is usually the case in international politics, the prescriptions of international law are bent by powerful states to achieve their own political goals. In the case of the Russian Federation, these goals are to restore as much as possible its status as a great world power after its geopolitical collapse in the 1990’s.

Conclusion

Although it is clear that the referendum to join with Russia has clearly garnered popular support, the conditions under which that support is engendered are questionable. Furthermore, regardless of the ‘will of the people,’ it is in clear violation of contemporary international law. This will bring about some interesting questions for those interested in international relations and international law, regarding the limits of self-determination, the influence of geo-politics, the power of regional hegemons, the attractiveness of ‘authoritarian goods,’ the integrity of the nation-state, the role of nationalism in a globalized society, and the effectiveness of dated concepts of international law. We have yet to see how the situation will play out, as it will undoubtedly continue to be a continuing issue of concern. Yet it is an important development, the significance of which should not be underestimated. It will be important to track the development of this issue as it unfolds.

Francafrique: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Central African Republic

Francafrique

Francafrique is a term which refers to the French’s policy of involvement in African affairs, and particularly in its former colonies. In the past three years, France has substantially intervened militarily in as many former territories. During the 2000’s, France was instrumental in leading European Union missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, 2006, and 2008. Since the mission in 2008 (Operation Artemis) and the resistance encountered from Germany, Britain, and several Eastern European states to that operation, France has acted unilaterally in more recent African peacekeeping missions. In 2011, France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire to capture former president Laurent Gbagbo and neutralize his forces carrying out horrendous acts of violence on local populations. Here, victory was unclear, as forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara were likewise responsible for mass murder and terrorism of civilians, yet the French troops sided firmly with Ouattara, who they saw as the legitimate president of the country. The United Nations, as per usual, took over peacekeeping operations once French and African Union troops had carried out most of the offensive against the rebels. From 2012 to 2013, French troops were again sent to west Africa, this time to Mali to support the government against separatist Taureg rebels and al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists, and last year, before the situation had even been resolved in Mali, the French were again called in by the United Nations to the Central African Republic to quell fighting between Muslim and Christian militias.

In each case France had the support of the United Nations, and the actions had generally high approval within the Assemblée Nationale (French parliament). Peacekeeping aid was (and is) most certainly needed in all three of these nations, which like many African states have drifted in and out of stability since the end of the Cold War. But the pattern of intervention is troubling to some. True, in each case French aid was called for by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Yet to some it appears that France has never fully been able to relinquish its presence in Africa. Close ties to the governments of Chad, Tunisia (both pre- and post-revolution), and Morocco, deemed regional partners, support its ongoing presence as an overseer of sorts in the region. Nor are any of these conflict areas strategically vital. Many have called for the increasingly significant African Union to take over responsibilities regarding such conflicts, yet France, despite insisting that it desires otherwise, remains heavily involved. Some analysts arguing for greater African empowerment see its continued policy of intervention in Africa to be a form of neo-colonialism, and some, for instance in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, question its effectiveness in resolving crises. At any rate, many governments in west and central Africa are more or less empowered based on French African policy, a situation many see as troubling.

Republique Centrafricaine

Fighting in the Central African Republic broke out in early 2013 after a group of Muslim rebels overthrew the military government of General François Bozizé, raping, pillaging, and killing (mostly Christian) civilians in the process. Under the Séléka government, civilians suffered more rape, pillage, and extrajudicial killings, in addition to being caught in ongoing fighting between Séléka militia and troops loyal to General Bozizé. With attention still turned to Mali, largely because of the rebels’ ideological and commercial connections to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, the conflict in the Central African Republic remained largely unnoticed by much of the world, though world leaders officially refused to recognize rebel leader Michel Djotodia and declared his actions as a coup d’état. It was not until a ceasefire declared in June 2013 was broken in August of last year that the CAR drew international attention, and French troops began arriving in the winter of 2013, again at the request of Ban Ki-Moon. 250 troops turned to 500, 500 to 1,600, and 1,600 was increased to 2,000 and the mission prolonged by four months two weeks ago, despite French President François Hollande’s promise of a ‘rapid’ intervention back in early December. The nation is still heavily embedded in conflict and human rights violations still occur on a daily basis, and there is no guarantee that France will be able to ensure its intervention remains short-lived. Until relief from a UN peacekeeping force comes, France will be ideologically committed to retaining troops in the country (and for good reason). The legacy of Francafrique therefore remains strong and is not likely to fade in the near future, and there is no reason to believe that France will abstain from future crises on the continent.

Is it a Problem?

Yes and no. No, because, of course, humanitarian aid in such crises is certainly necessary and appropriate. But yes, for several important reasons. First, because Francafrique is as much about choosing friends as it is identifying enemies. In the past France has worked closely with figures like deposed Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali and current Chadian President Idriss Déby, figures whose behavior is little better than the militia leaders they confront. A second and related reason is that any intervention in these types of conflicts that are not strictly neutral (and French interventions rarely are) runs the risk of becoming a ‘lesser of two evils’ situation, as in 2011 when French troops fought alongside pro-Ouattara supporters, many of whom were as brutal and ruthless as their opponents. Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are many critics who assert that the undeclared policy of Francafrique undermines African empowerment. This is certainly the argument raised by German and, to a lesser extent, British politicians, and is a major reason why European Union peacekeeping forces are not as forthcoming. Many argue that these conflicts may now be better managed by the African Union, which has developed a substantial and reasonably respectable peacekeeping force over the past decade. Such a policy would avoid neo-colonial overtones and strengthen the position of a badly-needed regional organization for the continent. Whatever the criticisms, it is hard for the Western world to sit back and watch these crises unfold. But the world of international politics is never black and white. Humanitarian issues typically need to be addressed in a manner that is as neutral as possible (or appropriate), and the strengthening of the African Union may be a key solution to ensure that such crises are resolved without overtones of European protectionism, which often undermine the very governments they seek to support. In any case, the truth is that the legacy of Francafrique is not going to end in the foreseeable future. Yet it must be considered in all its aspects if it is to remain a consistent factor in African affairs.

Crisis in Crimea

7 March, 2014

The latest move by the parliament of Crimea is more than most analysts were expecting. Crimea has always remained separate from larger Ukraine, even from the pro-Russian east, having not only a different ethnic makeup of majority ethnic Russians and Tartars who feel closely aligned with Russia, but also a semi-autonomous government since its inception in what was then the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. The revolution that toppled former president Yanukovych was of course led primarily by nationalist leaders from the western half of the country, who have downgraded Russia as a language, moved towards a conditional EU and a potential IMF loan to substitute for the $15b deal that Russia offered in late December, and is in general breaking its connections to Moscow. For many in Crimea, this is unwelcome news. For many, it is not simply a matter of political preference, but of ethnic pride.

History

All of Ukraine, of course, is historically connected to Russia. The word Ukraine means ‘backyard’ in Russian. Western ethnic Russians trace their roots to the Kievan Rus’ of the Dark Ages, an eastern Slavic people whose ancestry traces back to Viking slaves being sent down the Dnieper who made Kiev their capital in the 8^th – 9^th century CE. Kiev was a cultural capital in the east until the 11^th century, when clan rivalries and the rising influence of the city-state and trade capital of Novgorod combined to weaken the princes’ importance. Russians trace the origins of Moscow to Rus’ migrants. Later the whole region would of course come under the ‘Mongol yoke,’ during which time Moscow came to prosper as the dominant city-state in the region due to its growing wealth. With the collapse of the Mongol empire, the princes of Moscow gradually came to dominate the region. The area now known as Ukraine was known as a frontier region, a land of Cossacks (frontiersmen) and settled Tartars, who mainly came to reside in what is now known as Crimea.

As Russia expanded, first under Ivan the Terrible and his successors, and still later under the Romanov dynasty, Ukraine grew in importance as a breadbasket. Crimea, however, has always remained an exception in Ukraine: as noted, for many years it was dominated from Mongolian-descended Tartars, set apart both as a peninsula and by its excellent ports which contributed to the wealthy Black Sea trade. It came under the control of the Ottoman Empire as the Golden Horde of the Mongols receded as the status of protectorate, yet still maintained a fair amount of autonomy. As the Ottoman empire began to lose power in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, Russians moved into the territory, with ports and fortresses like Sevastopol eventually turning into Russian cities and settlements. The Crimean War fought in the mid-19^th century, though affirming Ottoman control of a great deal of the territory (still operating largely as an independent protectorate), reestablished Russian control of these ports and cities. As the Ottoman empire declined and eventually broke up after World War I, the territory had steadily come under Russian influence; however, it retained its long tradition of autonomous government. Even under the USSR, Crimea functioned as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It was gifted to Ukraine in 1954 by the Politburo in a largely symbolic gesture to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, there being in function no dividing line between Russia and Ukraine. When Ukraine broke away from the collapsing USSR in 1991, the constitution adopted enshrined Crimea’s exceptional status by granting it an autonomous parliament, granted the prime minister was recognized by the government in Kiev. The Russian Federation officially leased the port of Sevastopol, the traditional station of its Black Sea fleet since the 19^th century, in 1997, a deal that was controversially extended for 25 years in 2010 under the incoming Yanukovych administration. During the long transition from Ottoman protectorate to semi-autonomous state Crimea’s Tartar population was gradually overtaken by ethnic Russians, and later displaced by Josef Stalin’s persecutions. After Ukrainian independence, many returned, with the Tartar population now comprising roughly 12% of the population v. ethnic Russians’ 59%, with only 23% of the population identifying as ethnic Ukrainians. Thus over time Crimea has gradually become and still feels very attached to Russia.

The Current Crisis

During the revolution, Crimean newspapers continued to portray the protesters as criminals and fascists, and many in Crimea continue to see the recent events in Ukraine as a popular coup of a legitimately elected administration. They feel affronted by the power of the new heavily nationalist and western-leaning government and by the threat of severing ties to Russia. In late February, unknown pro-Russian gunmen seized several key buildings in the Crimean capital and blockaded major airports on the peninsula. Russia’s reaction was startlingly rapid, even given the importance of the Black Sea fleet stationed in Sevastopol. In fact, some have suggested that Russia had sent additional troops to the peninsula even before this, after the displacement of Yanukovych, although this has not been verified.

Two days after these events unfolded, the Russian parliament approved sending troops into the Crimea to resolve the crisis. Russian intentions are fairly clear to all involved. Although the toppling of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s was a time of great joy and relief to much of Russia, many Russians still resent the drastic decline in power and territory it suffered in the collapse. Russian intervention in Crimea closely resembles the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, during an uprising of forces in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since his first coming to power in 2000, Putin’s strategy has been to attempt to win back the geopolitical power of the former Soviet Union, and he has jealously protected its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Protecting ethnic Russians and encouraging local populations wishing to join with the Russian Federation is seen as a matter of national pride in this respect. The difference is that Crimea is not South Ossetia. Sevastopol, already mentioned as the home of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, is also the second busiest port in Ukraine, a major hub of trade in the Black Sea, and Crimea is of course substantially larger, apart from its more ethnically Russian population.

The autonomous Crimean parliament, now headed by a staunchly pro-Russian prime minister not recognized by the interim Kiev government, has voted to ask for accession to the Russian Federation and has promised a referendum to be held on 16 March. It is very possible that the referendum will pass. Regarding the situation on the ground, Ukrainian troops in the peninsula are being blockaded in barracks, and major access routes to the territory are being blocked. Many of the gunmen are clothed in Russian uniform, albeit without the insignia. The conflict threatens to exacerbate tensions between Russia and the West, and threaten the fragile interim government in Kiev. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov refuses to meet with his interim counterpart from Ukraine, and Russia acknowledges the presence of Russian troops as “self-defense forces.” Further, President Putin, always ready to manipulate Russian energy resources for political ends, has seen that Gazprom cancel its discount to Ukraine resulting from the 2010 naval fleet deal and demand a payment of $1.5b of Ukraine’s ever-present debt (which in itself remains another major threat to the new Ukrainian government). It is as yet unclear how the situation will unfold. Ukraine is willing to negotiate with Russia on condition that Russian forces be withdrawn from the peninsula, a condition that the Russians have thus far refused to meet.

Frozen Conflict?

Even if the referendum passes in Crimea, it will not be recognized by the government of Kiev as legal under the constitution. Most western countries will likely join in the rejection of its legitimacy. But Putin would likely use the event to argue the legitimacy of a Russian presence, and in so doing not only consolidate a major military and commercial foothold in the Black Sea, but substantially bolster his own popularity at home. Even if Crimea were to officially join the Russian Federation, which is highly unlikely given that move’s questionable legitimacy under international law, the region would likely remain largely autonomous. NATO is not likely intervene to protect the status of Crimea, nor is Russia likely to make it into a military conflict. The concern, really, is whether Crimea will become another ‘frozen conflict,’ like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, or perhaps more like Transnistria in Moldova, where the presence of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ makes it de facto beholden to Moscow. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, it is likely to weaken the legitimacy of the new Kiev government in the pro-Russian east of the country, which not only represents nearly half the population but also the majority of vital industrial centers which will be necessary for any independent Ukraine to maintain a robust domestic economy. In most of the likely outcomes of this situation, Moscow will have succeeded in weakening the new Ukrainian government and its pro-western leaders. In any case it will be, and is, a decisive moment in Ukraine’s revolution.

Putin’s Post-Sochi Persecutions

For the love of sport. Olympians this year refrained from making any commentary on the human rights travesties which were, are, and will continue to be normal routine in their host country of Russia. The highest pinnacle of athletic achievement must not be sullied by mere politics, by people’s living conditions, by issues of civil, political and human rights – the games shall exist in a world unto itself, shielded from the goings-on in the world surrounding them. Problem is, the Olympics did not take place in some special, insulated bubble. They took place in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And whether or not it would have made any difference, it is fair to question the conventional wisdom of this tradition when the country’s authoritarian leader receives the largest boost in approval ratings of his (third) presidency, its highest point since his (re-)inauguration in May of 2012. The figure now hovers at 67%, which is probably a fairly reliable figure. Loathe as the West is to admit it, there is very real support from a large cross-section of the Russian people for Vladimir Putin, the man that restored Russia to greatness after the debacle following the fall of the Soviet Union. For many, Putin brought strength where there was weakness, brought order where there was chaos, and put Russia back to work (unemployment dropped dramatically in the 2000’s) exploiting its natural resources, where before there was only financial ruin or mafia capitalism. Yet we all know the price of these ‘authoritarian goods.’ With his popular approval back on the upswing, and international attention deflected for the moment by the release of Pussy Riot and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the 14-year ruler is back to the old modus operandi of domestic political persecutions.

Almost without missing a beat, a trial of eight protesters from Putin’s May 2012 inauguration resumed the week after Sochi. Given the structuring of the Russian judicial system, it is only a matter of how severe the penalty for “mass rioting” will be: for Pussy Riot, it involved a trip to Siberia, and they are by no means the only victims of such politicized justice of late (indeed, they embrace their status as only a representative of many). Khodorkovsky, of course, was an old rival, released now when he has been broken down and made harmless: bankrupt, unwelcome in Russia, blocked from both industry and politics in his home country, and probably fearful of a fresh political charge (fearful enough to have left the country at the earliest opportunity). Putin no longer has any real rivals. Persecutions these days are more about maintaining ‘public order,’ the cornerstone of any authoritarian government. Charges like mass rioting or disturbing the peace are carried forward into the bowels of Russia’s inquisitorial judicial system.

How it works is this. Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, a ‘vertical of power’ has been established over local and regional governors and legislatures, who must report to presidentially-appointed plenipotentiaries, who have the power to dismiss these figures and entities. With legislation and administration brought under the control of the federal executive in this manner, the way is cleared for the courts to function as a subsidiarity of the executive branch. Through the Russian ‘Procuracy,’ the highest legal authority in the country, judges are appointed at all levels of government. Though the office of the procuracy is filled by the federal council, Putin’s inheritance of the one-party model of governance ensures that that position will always be filled by a subordinate owing direct allegiance to the head of the party (who at times has been Putin himself, and at other times chosen by him). Thus the presidential administration in effect maintains control over all levels of the court system. It is noteworthy that since 2000 the procuracy has never solved a case of political assassination or major financial crime, apart from the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Add to this that the Russian court system uses an inquisitorial model, meaning there is no trial by jury and all matters are decided by the judge. In addition, the investigating prosecutor is given free rein to unwarranted search and seizure, interrogations, and the ability to detain suspects for up to 48 hours, completely at their discretion. What all of this means in practice is that the guilty verdict for political opponents is never in doubt – the only uncertainties are the severity of the sentencing and the amount of harassment the friends and loved ones of the accused will be subjected to. This is intended to create a culture of fear among political opponents.

With his recent boost in popularity and all of these techniques at his disposal, President Putin is sure to engage in a fresh round of political persecutions, particularly as international attention has shifted from events in Russia for the moment. Nonetheless, this is an issue that those that value civil, political, and human rights should pay attention to. The message here: don’t forget about Russia so quickly.

Update: Ukraine’s Revolution

There is a reason why opposition leader Vitaly Klitschko is urging protesters in Kiev to stay on the streets. Even after the Ukrainian parliament has voted to impeach President Yanukovych, to restore the 2004 constitution limiting presidential powers, to appoint a member of the opposition Fatherland party as acting president and prime minister, and to hold elections on 25 May, even after opposition figure and former presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko has been freed from political charges, even after Viktor Yanukovych has tried to flee the country and his luxury retreat has been nationalized, the revolution, if it is to be successful, is not over. Even in the heady days following the liberal Orange Revolution of 2004 and the election of Viktor Yuschenko as president with Tymoshenko as prime minister, Ukrainian politics remained rife with corruption, political rivalries, and general dysfunction. There are serious underlying problems in Ukrainian politics beyond one man or one party that need to be addressed if the country is truly to liberalize. Aside from this, there are problems with how the aftermath is being managed. The fact that Angela Merkel would reach out so prominently to Tymoshenko, whose career has been plagued with corruption and which began under the wing of former authoritarian president Leonid Kuchma, is a worrying development. Her release is likely to be welcomed by many, but her return to power may prove to be highly controversial, as the entirety of the political structure became tainted with disenchantment in the years following the Orange Revolution to include the Fatherland party. At any rate, Tymoshenko does not enjoy significant support in the eastern half of the country, and thus is not likely to be the figure to unite the people of Ukraine, as Merkel has urged.

Indeed it is the eastern half of the country that the EU and US negotiators need to consider in this situation. Russian has been downgraded as a language from its co-official status with Ukrainian, though nearly 40% of Ukrainians speak Russian at home, which may seem an insignificant point, but in actuality highly symbolic as evidenced by its status on Yanukovych’s political platform in 2010, along with other references to Russian ethnicity and unity which play well in the east and Crimea where many align themselves as ethnically Russian. There are other trappings of western-leaning nationalist symbolism which many are not likely to welcome. The highly nationalistic opposition figures have found much less traction in the east than the west. If it seems that the east v. west point is being played up too much, it is not; there exists a very real and tangible separation within the country between nationalist Ukrainians and those that identify with Russia. What is more, the Party of Regions (Yanukovych’s party), whose stronghold Is in these predominantly Russian-leaning parts of the country, has remained fairly intact in the immediate aftermath. Though it now publicly disavows former President Yanukovych and much of his cabinet, in reality there are still more who adhere to the ‘Russian model’ of politics. And of course this tendency is not limited to one party only. It is for this reason that many Ukrainian protesters are demanding a complete change in Ukraine’s political composition, and that Klitschko has told his supporters to stay in the streets.

All of this is of course not to mention Russia’s involvement in the situation. Russia’s economic power, primarily supported through energy exports much of which travels through Ukraine on its way to Western Europe, makes playing geopolitical games with its authoritarian government very difficult. Ukraine of course turned down an EU deal for a Russian loan, and while the EU is likely to substitute for or better the offer of Russia, the Ukraine will remain deeply in debt to Moscow. One only has to look at the numerous gas shutoffs, affecting many living in poverty in Central and even Western Europe, to see that this debt is very tangibly manipulated. The Ukraine would likely require a substantial IMF loan to adopt a role as a true negotiator with Russia, which has yet to be offered. Russia will also certainly see the EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine as an affront to their interests, explaining its current refusal to bargain in the aftermath and all else that that entails.

In short, the revolution, if it is to be successful, will require both substantial change from within and substantial support from without. Mr. Klitschko is right to tell people to stay in the streets. There is much yet to unfold, and is not at all certain that the hope of liberalization will not fade away as it did in 2004. Though much is different, much remains the same.