Francafrique
Francafrique is a term which refers to the French’s policy of involvement in African affairs, and particularly in its former colonies. In the past three years, France has substantially intervened militarily in as many former territories. During the 2000’s, France was instrumental in leading European Union missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, 2006, and 2008. Since the mission in 2008 (Operation Artemis) and the resistance encountered from Germany, Britain, and several Eastern European states to that operation, France has acted unilaterally in more recent African peacekeeping missions. In 2011, France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire to capture former president Laurent Gbagbo and neutralize his forces carrying out horrendous acts of violence on local populations. Here, victory was unclear, as forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara were likewise responsible for mass murder and terrorism of civilians, yet the French troops sided firmly with Ouattara, who they saw as the legitimate president of the country. The United Nations, as per usual, took over peacekeeping operations once French and African Union troops had carried out most of the offensive against the rebels. From 2012 to 2013, French troops were again sent to west Africa, this time to Mali to support the government against separatist Taureg rebels and al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists, and last year, before the situation had even been resolved in Mali, the French were again called in by the United Nations to the Central African Republic to quell fighting between Muslim and Christian militias.
In each case France had the support of the United Nations, and the actions had generally high approval within the Assemblée Nationale (French parliament). Peacekeeping aid was (and is) most certainly needed in all three of these nations, which like many African states have drifted in and out of stability since the end of the Cold War. But the pattern of intervention is troubling to some. True, in each case French aid was called for by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Yet to some it appears that France has never fully been able to relinquish its presence in Africa. Close ties to the governments of Chad, Tunisia (both pre- and post-revolution), and Morocco, deemed regional partners, support its ongoing presence as an overseer of sorts in the region. Nor are any of these conflict areas strategically vital. Many have called for the increasingly significant African Union to take over responsibilities regarding such conflicts, yet France, despite insisting that it desires otherwise, remains heavily involved. Some analysts arguing for greater African empowerment see its continued policy of intervention in Africa to be a form of neo-colonialism, and some, for instance in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, question its effectiveness in resolving crises. At any rate, many governments in west and central Africa are more or less empowered based on French African policy, a situation many see as troubling.
Republique Centrafricaine
Fighting in the Central African Republic broke out in early 2013 after a group of Muslim rebels overthrew the military government of General François Bozizé, raping, pillaging, and killing (mostly Christian) civilians in the process. Under the Séléka government, civilians suffered more rape, pillage, and extrajudicial killings, in addition to being caught in ongoing fighting between Séléka militia and troops loyal to General Bozizé. With attention still turned to Mali, largely because of the rebels’ ideological and commercial connections to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, the conflict in the Central African Republic remained largely unnoticed by much of the world, though world leaders officially refused to recognize rebel leader Michel Djotodia and declared his actions as a coup d’état. It was not until a ceasefire declared in June 2013 was broken in August of last year that the CAR drew international attention, and French troops began arriving in the winter of 2013, again at the request of Ban Ki-Moon. 250 troops turned to 500, 500 to 1,600, and 1,600 was increased to 2,000 and the mission prolonged by four months two weeks ago, despite French President François Hollande’s promise of a ‘rapid’ intervention back in early December. The nation is still heavily embedded in conflict and human rights violations still occur on a daily basis, and there is no guarantee that France will be able to ensure its intervention remains short-lived. Until relief from a UN peacekeeping force comes, France will be ideologically committed to retaining troops in the country (and for good reason). The legacy of Francafrique therefore remains strong and is not likely to fade in the near future, and there is no reason to believe that France will abstain from future crises on the continent.
Is it a Problem?
Yes and no. No, because, of course, humanitarian aid in such crises is certainly necessary and appropriate. But yes, for several important reasons. First, because Francafrique is as much about choosing friends as it is identifying enemies. In the past France has worked closely with figures like deposed Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali and current Chadian President Idriss Déby, figures whose behavior is little better than the militia leaders they confront. A second and related reason is that any intervention in these types of conflicts that are not strictly neutral (and French interventions rarely are) runs the risk of becoming a ‘lesser of two evils’ situation, as in 2011 when French troops fought alongside pro-Ouattara supporters, many of whom were as brutal and ruthless as their opponents. Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are many critics who assert that the undeclared policy of Francafrique undermines African empowerment. This is certainly the argument raised by German and, to a lesser extent, British politicians, and is a major reason why European Union peacekeeping forces are not as forthcoming. Many argue that these conflicts may now be better managed by the African Union, which has developed a substantial and reasonably respectable peacekeeping force over the past decade. Such a policy would avoid neo-colonial overtones and strengthen the position of a badly-needed regional organization for the continent. Whatever the criticisms, it is hard for the Western world to sit back and watch these crises unfold. But the world of international politics is never black and white. Humanitarian issues typically need to be addressed in a manner that is as neutral as possible (or appropriate), and the strengthening of the African Union may be a key solution to ensure that such crises are resolved without overtones of European protectionism, which often undermine the very governments they seek to support. In any case, the truth is that the legacy of Francafrique is not going to end in the foreseeable future. Yet it must be considered in all its aspects if it is to remain a consistent factor in African affairs.
Des américains 