France: Front National

Although many find the ideology of the Front National to be outside the limits of a liberal society, they have achieved resounding success in recent elections

Last week, on 23 March, 2014, the extreme-right Front National party in France put forward its strongest showing in local elections in recent years. Although it only contested in 600 out of 3,600 constituencies, it won over 7% of the popular vote. The party’s leader, Marine Le Pen, said the showings established the party as a political force at both the national and local level. Although in reality it has been such for a long time, the opportunity for publicity both shows and increases the strength of the party, reassuring its status as the ‘third party’ of French politics. The reason this is worrying, and the reason that it is news, is that the Front National is by all measures a party of the extreme-right. It has a revolutionary ideology which calls for the overthrow of the Fifth Republic, the concentration of political power in the executive branch, open racial discrimination combined with welfare state policies (i.e., national-socialism), a complete and unconditional withdrawal from the European Union, and national isolation. Although its messages may be tempered at various times and in various places to increase its electoral appeal, these are the longstanding bases of its party ideology. And although many in France find its message to be outside the limits of acceptable political discourse (the current prime minister is quoted as saying on national television that “wherever the Front National is in a position to win the second [final] round, all who support democracy and the republic have a duty to prevent them”), the party has a significant base of loyal voters that it has gained and kept over the past 30 years. This article will examine its origins and development that has allowed such a radical party to become the ‘third party’ of French politics.

Origins and Ideology

The origins of the Front National are deeply steeped in the tradition of extreme-right politics in France. Arising out of the Nouvelle Droite (New Right), which was composed of political activists from Vichy apologists, to neo-fascists, pied-noirs (former French colonists in Algeria), and monarchists, the Front National was created in 1972 to unite all the various factions of the extreme-right together to achieve greater electoral victories. This was a novel idea, as many previous political movements of the far-right rejected democratic parliamentary politics. The Front National was, and continues to be, for all intents and purposes a radical party. Although the party obviously needed to temper its anti-parliamentarism to carry out its purpose in gaining representation, a rejection of the Fifth Republic has always remained an important component of its official ideology. Its leader for many years, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has repeatedly called for the foundation of a ‘Sixth Republic,’ which would be based on a powerful executive, discrimination against peoples not of French ethnic origin, and the establishment of a police state. Apart from this, the Front National calls for a complete withdrawal from the European Union, the establishment of a welfare state confined to ethnic French citizens (national-socialism), a rejection of the global market, and isolation and insulation from cosmopolitanism. The Front National believes, as a central tenet of its ideology, in the fundamental inequality of peoples (much as with most far-right parties in Europe). Le Pen is quoting as saying that “in the temperate climates of Europe, intelligence has developed at the expense of unlimited sexuality, thus determining the superiority of Europe.” Finally, the party is a revolutionary party in believing that it should serve as a vanguard of a revolution to overthrow the Fifth Republic.

Early Electoral History

At first, the Front National performed miserably by electoral standards. Many in the far-right political movements of the 70’s rejected participation in the parliamentary system, and instead opted to support traditional militant activist groups. Given the scope of ideologies the Front National was seeking to represent, it was in need of a unifying political issue that across all the various factions of the extreme-right. In the past, this has been the only way for the extreme-right to gain any political success. In the years immediately following WWII, it was Nazi sympathy and nostalgia for the Vichy regime, in the 1950’s the Indo-China War, and in the early 1960’s it was the Algerian War. By the early 70’s, with decolonization already accomplished, the only such issue that appealed to all members of the far-right was anti-communism. However, the mainstream right party of the day was already staunchly anti-communist, and as the 70’s wore on and the USSR began to show cracks the communist threat was already receding as a political issue. The Front National would eventually find its unifying issue in immigration at the end of the 1970’s, but before it could effectively exploit this issue the party dynamics of the country had to change. This would come with the fall of the Communist Party (Parti Communiste Française).

Electoral Breakthrough and Consolidation (1979-1988)

The French Communist Party had been steadily losing support during the Brezhnev years in the USSR, when the fundamental flaws in the state-owned economic system were becoming apparent. The Communists lacked the ability to attract new voters, satisfy its traditional working-class political base on important political issues, and maintain party loyalty. Grasping for a new unifying issue, it was the Communists, whose traditional bases of support came from the working class of the inner cities, who first exploited non-European immigration in its political platform. Taking a cue, the Front National also exploited this issue, with its support base in largely the same demographic groups and geographic locations. However, it was unsuccessful at first, as it were losing in competition with the Communist Party. In 1981, the Front National won only 0.3% of the national popular vote. However, as the 1980’s progressed, several important shifts occurred across the French political landscape. First, as already noted, the Communist Party largely collapsed as a political force. Second, during the early 80’s there was a growing pattern of defection from the mainstream parties, which the Front National benefited from by attracting these voters (as well as first-time voters who likewise opted out of the mainstream). Third, immigration was steadily increasing, and whereas it had in earlier years largely been migrant workers coming into the country, after the ban on such immigration the dynamic shifted to family unification, and it became clear that the migrants did not intend to leave. They concentrated in the same working-class districts where the Communists and the Front National found their electoral support base, allowing the FN to effectively exploit an issue which many felt was being neglected by the mainstream parties. The party’s percentage of the popular national vote went from 0.3% in 1981 to 10.9% in 1984, only 0.3% behind the Communist Party. It attracted 48% of voters who claimed immigration as their number one issue in the elections. In the following years the party proved to be extremely successful in maintaining voter loyalty, as well as attracting new and defecting voters. Le Pen was added to the list of presidential candidates from 1984 until 2008, after which he was succeeded by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. In 1988 Le Pen won 14.4% of the first round of presidential elections. When the wall fell, globalization ensued, and European countries were drafting the revolutionary Maastricht Treaty which would create the European Union that we know today, the appeal of the party for those who felt threatened and disenfranchised by these developments exploded. Like all far-right parties in Europe, the Front National capitalized on fear and anger to consolidate its success.

Forcing Compromise (1988-2012)

After the first headscarf debate in 1989 (in which Muslim students were expelled for wearing headscarves), the mainstream party of the right (Jacques Chirac’s Rassemblement pour la Republic, or RPR) took a radical turn on immigration, in part responding to the electoral success of the Front National which came largely at their expense. Le Pen responded in turn, and his party was able to hold its ground, enjoying 38% national approval for its stance on immigration in 1991. With the collapse of communism, hitherto a main rallying point for the right-wing, and the establishment of the Schengen Agreement allowing visa-free travel within the European Union, immigration had become all the more important. The Front National additionally began to challenge the European integration process which allowed for freedom of movement and porous borders (along with, according to Le Pen, a deterioration of national values), a maneuver which met with great success. Jacques Chirac’s mainstream right-wing RPR/UDF coalition continued to attempt to co-opt the Front National on its main issues, shifting the entire political landscape of the country towards the right. In 2002, however, the success of the Front National became shockingly apparent. Le Pen beat the center-left candidate in the first round of presidential elections, leaving himself contending directly with Jacques Chirac for the presidency. The nation was faced with an anti-Semitic, revolutionary, borderline neo-fascist presidential candidate in the final round, who still won nearly 18% of the popular vote. It was after this election that the career of former president Nicolas Sarkozy began, as interior minister and a staunch anti-immigration figure himself. During the 2000’s, a resurgence of the left-wing and the campaign strategies of Nicolas Sarkozy served to restrain the Front National’s growth, at least until the Eurozone crisis again stirred up popular fears and national protectionism. The Front National won 9.4% of the popular vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections, down from 2002 but still enough to maintain its status as the second party of the right-wing. After this, Jean-Marie Le Pen was succeeded as leader of the party by his daughter, Marine Le Pen, who made a presidential run in 2012, winning 18% in the first round.

The Front National Today

The reason why there is such concern with the Front National’s recent electoral success is that it retains ethnic discrimination, withdrawal from the European Union, and the establishment of a police state as central tenets of its political platform. Although many in France find its ideologies outside the limits of acceptable political discourse, the party has retained the loyalty of many voters and continues to attract new ones. In Europe, many other far-right parties with similar views look upon France’s Front National as a success story to be emulated. To date there is no reason to believe its influence will decline; indeed, all the factors are present to further its success – dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, an anti-establishment attitude among youth voters, economic recession, continued Islamaphobia, rejection of globalization, the erosion of the welfare state, and talk of further European integration. All of these provide fertile ground for every far-right party in Europe, yet the Front National has an established and reliable base of support upon which to build further electoral success. Marine Le Pen has been largely accepted as leader of the party in place of her father, and loyalty to the party remains high. Although the Front National may not (yet) have militias in the streets like the far-right parties of Eastern Europe, it may be argued that its position in mainstream politics makes it a more tangible threat. In coming years, it will continue to be important to watch (and guard against) the Front National in France.

 

On The Scottish Independence Referendum

Overview

On September 18, 2014, every eligible voter born in Scotland will be faced with a referendum which will ask the question: “Should Scotland be an independent nation?” The question has been heavily debated over nearly the past two decades, as Scotland has gradually attained greater regional autonomy and devolution from the rest of the United Kingdom. The final agreement to hold such a referendum came after an overwhelming victory of the Scottish National Party (as the name suggests, a heavily nationalist political organization) in 2011. The party, led by Alex Salmond, was the first party in the regional Scottish parliament to win an overall majority, capturing 45% of the seats, which represented an increase of 13% over the results of the 2007 elections. According to recent polls, the Scottish National Party won the highest approval rating of any political party in the regional parliament, and its leader, Alex Salmond, likewise captured the highest approval of any party leader. However, it is unlikely that the referendum will pass: recent polls show that only 30-39% of Scots favor complete independence from the United Kingdom. However, ever greater devolution from the UK polled considerably higher, at around 70%. Should the referendum fail, Mr. Salmond has promised it will not be repeated: he has described it as a ‘once in a lifetime event.’ The goal is to avoid the creation of a “neverendum” such as exists in Quebec in Canada, where such referendums are held repeatedly every few years. Therefore, there is a fair amount of significance attached to this event.

History

Calls for Scotland’s disunion from the UK have existed practically since the union of the two nations in 1707. In 1745, the so-called Jacobite rebellion, premised upon Scottish nationalism, unfolded as a Catholic pretender to the British throne attempted to lead a rebellion to gain control of the union. However, for much of its history thereafter, there have been few attempts at disunion. The Jacobite tradition was carried onwards largely in a ceremonial fashion, to celebrate a distinct cultural identity and history. The traditions of kilts, bagpipes, and highland games were largely reinvented in and by the romantic Victorian era. Through the 20^th century, Scotland has a history of traditionally favoring welfare state values, reflected in the traditional success of leftist political parties. In 1979, in a political maneuver by the Labour party, which has always enjoyed strong support among Scots, a post-legislative referendum was held on the Scotland Act of 1978 promoting greater autonomy. After the failure of this movement, a second referendum, largely supported by the new Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, was held pre-legislatively in 1997, leading to the Scotland Act of 1998 and the creation of a Scottish parliament and executive in 2009. The Scottish National Party quickly became the second largest party in the assembly, to serve two terms as the main opposition party, and then to win a majority, forming a minority government, in 2007. The Scottish Executive was rebranded the Scottish Government by the SNP, and further devolution and possible independence were to increase in significance in the political discourse. In 2011 the SNP became the first party to win an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament, forming for the first time a minority government which soon promised a referendum on Scottish independence within 4 years. The issue has become a center of discourse within Scottish politics, and a date for the referendum was eventually set, after passing the legislature in November 2013, for September 18, 2014.

Ideology

Much debate about Scottish independence emphasizes the role of ideological difference in political decisions. The concept of the welfare state has remained strong in Scotland despite the shift to the right that followed Thatcher in Westminster politics and the development of neo-liberalism throughout the 90’s and 2000’s. The fundamental difference, for pro-independence idealists, and grounds for political disunion with the UK, is that Scotland is more ready to embrace a Nordic model of social democracy as opposed to the neo-liberal serving as the basis for mainstream UK politics, and ready to embrace more socially progressive policies. The difficulty for Scotland is that SNP leaders claim to want to enhance the welfare state model while still lowering corporate taxes – it is unclear how this is likely to function (such models have been tried and failed). Scotland may need more economic control than it can actually attain to make such a model work, which brings us to the implications of Scottish independence.

Implications

The factor which would be most likely to serve as a foundation of a developing independent Scottish economy would be revenue from oil deposits in the North Sea. Maintenance of this fundamental natural resource would ensure Scotland’s wealth as an independent nation. Scotland, however, would be subject to a number of constraints concerning its control of macroeconomic policy.

To begin with, it is widely accepted that an independent Scotland would become a member of the European Union, with all the trade rules and regulations that go with. In the absence of a large national production sector, and with an estimated 15% of its wealth coming from economically volatile natural resource assets, Scotland would likely follow other ‘virtual’ nations of Europe (e.g., Ireland, Belgium) in lowering corporate tax rates to attract foreign direct investment. As has been seen in the initial throws of the Eurozone crisis, such an economic foundation is tenuous at best, and what is more, it is difficult to reconcile such an economic strategy with a plan for greater socio-economic benefits under the welfare state.

Second, Scotland will not be able to meet the criteria for joining the euro, which are very strict and difficult to maintain (in fact, most Eurozone countries no longer actually meet the criteria). Seeing as how, with climbing inflation and a growing deficit, the UK only actually meets one of the criteria for joining the Euro (low interest rates), there is no reasonable belief that Scotland will be able to join the euro in the foreseeable future. This reduces it to continuing to use the pound. Yet the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, a conservative, has already announced that he will not allow Scottish influence over the pound, still leaving Scotland without any means of developing an independent monetary policy. In this sense, Scotland would likely remain somewhat beholden to the Westminster government. Such a situation may become even more complicated if Scotland moves toward the EU even as the UK is moving towards partial withdrawal from the entity. There are also practical matters to deal with, including energy subsidies (traditionally coming from the UK central bank), Scotland’s adoption of its share of the UK national debt, and a multi-billion dollar nuclear submarine fleet, Trident, stationed near Glasgow. In short, it is difficult to see how an independent Scotland would dramatically change without great difficulty.

An Independent Scotland?

It is for perhaps these reasons that more Scots are opting for further gradual devolution than for outright independence. Independence is not impossible, however, as a simple majority will decide the issue. In the coming months, the two movements, “Yes, Scotland” and “Better Together” are likely to publicize the event and forward strong arguments for both sides. The result should yet be regarded as unpredictable, and the implications could be considerable. Come September, will Scotland become the newest nation on earth? The answer to that question, and its relative geopolitical importance, is an issue to be decided by the Scots.

Francafrique: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Central African Republic

Francafrique

Francafrique is a term which refers to the French’s policy of involvement in African affairs, and particularly in its former colonies. In the past three years, France has substantially intervened militarily in as many former territories. During the 2000’s, France was instrumental in leading European Union missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, 2006, and 2008. Since the mission in 2008 (Operation Artemis) and the resistance encountered from Germany, Britain, and several Eastern European states to that operation, France has acted unilaterally in more recent African peacekeeping missions. In 2011, France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire to capture former president Laurent Gbagbo and neutralize his forces carrying out horrendous acts of violence on local populations. Here, victory was unclear, as forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara were likewise responsible for mass murder and terrorism of civilians, yet the French troops sided firmly with Ouattara, who they saw as the legitimate president of the country. The United Nations, as per usual, took over peacekeeping operations once French and African Union troops had carried out most of the offensive against the rebels. From 2012 to 2013, French troops were again sent to west Africa, this time to Mali to support the government against separatist Taureg rebels and al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists, and last year, before the situation had even been resolved in Mali, the French were again called in by the United Nations to the Central African Republic to quell fighting between Muslim and Christian militias.

In each case France had the support of the United Nations, and the actions had generally high approval within the Assemblée Nationale (French parliament). Peacekeeping aid was (and is) most certainly needed in all three of these nations, which like many African states have drifted in and out of stability since the end of the Cold War. But the pattern of intervention is troubling to some. True, in each case French aid was called for by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Yet to some it appears that France has never fully been able to relinquish its presence in Africa. Close ties to the governments of Chad, Tunisia (both pre- and post-revolution), and Morocco, deemed regional partners, support its ongoing presence as an overseer of sorts in the region. Nor are any of these conflict areas strategically vital. Many have called for the increasingly significant African Union to take over responsibilities regarding such conflicts, yet France, despite insisting that it desires otherwise, remains heavily involved. Some analysts arguing for greater African empowerment see its continued policy of intervention in Africa to be a form of neo-colonialism, and some, for instance in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, question its effectiveness in resolving crises. At any rate, many governments in west and central Africa are more or less empowered based on French African policy, a situation many see as troubling.

Republique Centrafricaine

Fighting in the Central African Republic broke out in early 2013 after a group of Muslim rebels overthrew the military government of General François Bozizé, raping, pillaging, and killing (mostly Christian) civilians in the process. Under the Séléka government, civilians suffered more rape, pillage, and extrajudicial killings, in addition to being caught in ongoing fighting between Séléka militia and troops loyal to General Bozizé. With attention still turned to Mali, largely because of the rebels’ ideological and commercial connections to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, the conflict in the Central African Republic remained largely unnoticed by much of the world, though world leaders officially refused to recognize rebel leader Michel Djotodia and declared his actions as a coup d’état. It was not until a ceasefire declared in June 2013 was broken in August of last year that the CAR drew international attention, and French troops began arriving in the winter of 2013, again at the request of Ban Ki-Moon. 250 troops turned to 500, 500 to 1,600, and 1,600 was increased to 2,000 and the mission prolonged by four months two weeks ago, despite French President François Hollande’s promise of a ‘rapid’ intervention back in early December. The nation is still heavily embedded in conflict and human rights violations still occur on a daily basis, and there is no guarantee that France will be able to ensure its intervention remains short-lived. Until relief from a UN peacekeeping force comes, France will be ideologically committed to retaining troops in the country (and for good reason). The legacy of Francafrique therefore remains strong and is not likely to fade in the near future, and there is no reason to believe that France will abstain from future crises on the continent.

Is it a Problem?

Yes and no. No, because, of course, humanitarian aid in such crises is certainly necessary and appropriate. But yes, for several important reasons. First, because Francafrique is as much about choosing friends as it is identifying enemies. In the past France has worked closely with figures like deposed Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali and current Chadian President Idriss Déby, figures whose behavior is little better than the militia leaders they confront. A second and related reason is that any intervention in these types of conflicts that are not strictly neutral (and French interventions rarely are) runs the risk of becoming a ‘lesser of two evils’ situation, as in 2011 when French troops fought alongside pro-Ouattara supporters, many of whom were as brutal and ruthless as their opponents. Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are many critics who assert that the undeclared policy of Francafrique undermines African empowerment. This is certainly the argument raised by German and, to a lesser extent, British politicians, and is a major reason why European Union peacekeeping forces are not as forthcoming. Many argue that these conflicts may now be better managed by the African Union, which has developed a substantial and reasonably respectable peacekeeping force over the past decade. Such a policy would avoid neo-colonial overtones and strengthen the position of a badly-needed regional organization for the continent. Whatever the criticisms, it is hard for the Western world to sit back and watch these crises unfold. But the world of international politics is never black and white. Humanitarian issues typically need to be addressed in a manner that is as neutral as possible (or appropriate), and the strengthening of the African Union may be a key solution to ensure that such crises are resolved without overtones of European protectionism, which often undermine the very governments they seek to support. In any case, the truth is that the legacy of Francafrique is not going to end in the foreseeable future. Yet it must be considered in all its aspects if it is to remain a consistent factor in African affairs.

Crisis in Crimea

7 March, 2014

The latest move by the parliament of Crimea is more than most analysts were expecting. Crimea has always remained separate from larger Ukraine, even from the pro-Russian east, having not only a different ethnic makeup of majority ethnic Russians and Tartars who feel closely aligned with Russia, but also a semi-autonomous government since its inception in what was then the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. The revolution that toppled former president Yanukovych was of course led primarily by nationalist leaders from the western half of the country, who have downgraded Russia as a language, moved towards a conditional EU and a potential IMF loan to substitute for the $15b deal that Russia offered in late December, and is in general breaking its connections to Moscow. For many in Crimea, this is unwelcome news. For many, it is not simply a matter of political preference, but of ethnic pride.

History

All of Ukraine, of course, is historically connected to Russia. The word Ukraine means ‘backyard’ in Russian. Western ethnic Russians trace their roots to the Kievan Rus’ of the Dark Ages, an eastern Slavic people whose ancestry traces back to Viking slaves being sent down the Dnieper who made Kiev their capital in the 8^th – 9^th century CE. Kiev was a cultural capital in the east until the 11^th century, when clan rivalries and the rising influence of the city-state and trade capital of Novgorod combined to weaken the princes’ importance. Russians trace the origins of Moscow to Rus’ migrants. Later the whole region would of course come under the ‘Mongol yoke,’ during which time Moscow came to prosper as the dominant city-state in the region due to its growing wealth. With the collapse of the Mongol empire, the princes of Moscow gradually came to dominate the region. The area now known as Ukraine was known as a frontier region, a land of Cossacks (frontiersmen) and settled Tartars, who mainly came to reside in what is now known as Crimea.

As Russia expanded, first under Ivan the Terrible and his successors, and still later under the Romanov dynasty, Ukraine grew in importance as a breadbasket. Crimea, however, has always remained an exception in Ukraine: as noted, for many years it was dominated from Mongolian-descended Tartars, set apart both as a peninsula and by its excellent ports which contributed to the wealthy Black Sea trade. It came under the control of the Ottoman Empire as the Golden Horde of the Mongols receded as the status of protectorate, yet still maintained a fair amount of autonomy. As the Ottoman empire began to lose power in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, Russians moved into the territory, with ports and fortresses like Sevastopol eventually turning into Russian cities and settlements. The Crimean War fought in the mid-19^th century, though affirming Ottoman control of a great deal of the territory (still operating largely as an independent protectorate), reestablished Russian control of these ports and cities. As the Ottoman empire declined and eventually broke up after World War I, the territory had steadily come under Russian influence; however, it retained its long tradition of autonomous government. Even under the USSR, Crimea functioned as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It was gifted to Ukraine in 1954 by the Politburo in a largely symbolic gesture to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, there being in function no dividing line between Russia and Ukraine. When Ukraine broke away from the collapsing USSR in 1991, the constitution adopted enshrined Crimea’s exceptional status by granting it an autonomous parliament, granted the prime minister was recognized by the government in Kiev. The Russian Federation officially leased the port of Sevastopol, the traditional station of its Black Sea fleet since the 19^th century, in 1997, a deal that was controversially extended for 25 years in 2010 under the incoming Yanukovych administration. During the long transition from Ottoman protectorate to semi-autonomous state Crimea’s Tartar population was gradually overtaken by ethnic Russians, and later displaced by Josef Stalin’s persecutions. After Ukrainian independence, many returned, with the Tartar population now comprising roughly 12% of the population v. ethnic Russians’ 59%, with only 23% of the population identifying as ethnic Ukrainians. Thus over time Crimea has gradually become and still feels very attached to Russia.

The Current Crisis

During the revolution, Crimean newspapers continued to portray the protesters as criminals and fascists, and many in Crimea continue to see the recent events in Ukraine as a popular coup of a legitimately elected administration. They feel affronted by the power of the new heavily nationalist and western-leaning government and by the threat of severing ties to Russia. In late February, unknown pro-Russian gunmen seized several key buildings in the Crimean capital and blockaded major airports on the peninsula. Russia’s reaction was startlingly rapid, even given the importance of the Black Sea fleet stationed in Sevastopol. In fact, some have suggested that Russia had sent additional troops to the peninsula even before this, after the displacement of Yanukovych, although this has not been verified.

Two days after these events unfolded, the Russian parliament approved sending troops into the Crimea to resolve the crisis. Russian intentions are fairly clear to all involved. Although the toppling of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s was a time of great joy and relief to much of Russia, many Russians still resent the drastic decline in power and territory it suffered in the collapse. Russian intervention in Crimea closely resembles the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, during an uprising of forces in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since his first coming to power in 2000, Putin’s strategy has been to attempt to win back the geopolitical power of the former Soviet Union, and he has jealously protected its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Protecting ethnic Russians and encouraging local populations wishing to join with the Russian Federation is seen as a matter of national pride in this respect. The difference is that Crimea is not South Ossetia. Sevastopol, already mentioned as the home of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, is also the second busiest port in Ukraine, a major hub of trade in the Black Sea, and Crimea is of course substantially larger, apart from its more ethnically Russian population.

The autonomous Crimean parliament, now headed by a staunchly pro-Russian prime minister not recognized by the interim Kiev government, has voted to ask for accession to the Russian Federation and has promised a referendum to be held on 16 March. It is very possible that the referendum will pass. Regarding the situation on the ground, Ukrainian troops in the peninsula are being blockaded in barracks, and major access routes to the territory are being blocked. Many of the gunmen are clothed in Russian uniform, albeit without the insignia. The conflict threatens to exacerbate tensions between Russia and the West, and threaten the fragile interim government in Kiev. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov refuses to meet with his interim counterpart from Ukraine, and Russia acknowledges the presence of Russian troops as “self-defense forces.” Further, President Putin, always ready to manipulate Russian energy resources for political ends, has seen that Gazprom cancel its discount to Ukraine resulting from the 2010 naval fleet deal and demand a payment of $1.5b of Ukraine’s ever-present debt (which in itself remains another major threat to the new Ukrainian government). It is as yet unclear how the situation will unfold. Ukraine is willing to negotiate with Russia on condition that Russian forces be withdrawn from the peninsula, a condition that the Russians have thus far refused to meet.

Frozen Conflict?

Even if the referendum passes in Crimea, it will not be recognized by the government of Kiev as legal under the constitution. Most western countries will likely join in the rejection of its legitimacy. But Putin would likely use the event to argue the legitimacy of a Russian presence, and in so doing not only consolidate a major military and commercial foothold in the Black Sea, but substantially bolster his own popularity at home. Even if Crimea were to officially join the Russian Federation, which is highly unlikely given that move’s questionable legitimacy under international law, the region would likely remain largely autonomous. NATO is not likely intervene to protect the status of Crimea, nor is Russia likely to make it into a military conflict. The concern, really, is whether Crimea will become another ‘frozen conflict,’ like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, or perhaps more like Transnistria in Moldova, where the presence of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ makes it de facto beholden to Moscow. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, it is likely to weaken the legitimacy of the new Kiev government in the pro-Russian east of the country, which not only represents nearly half the population but also the majority of vital industrial centers which will be necessary for any independent Ukraine to maintain a robust domestic economy. In most of the likely outcomes of this situation, Moscow will have succeeded in weakening the new Ukrainian government and its pro-western leaders. In any case it will be, and is, a decisive moment in Ukraine’s revolution.

Update: Ukraine’s Revolution

There is a reason why opposition leader Vitaly Klitschko is urging protesters in Kiev to stay on the streets. Even after the Ukrainian parliament has voted to impeach President Yanukovych, to restore the 2004 constitution limiting presidential powers, to appoint a member of the opposition Fatherland party as acting president and prime minister, and to hold elections on 25 May, even after opposition figure and former presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko has been freed from political charges, even after Viktor Yanukovych has tried to flee the country and his luxury retreat has been nationalized, the revolution, if it is to be successful, is not over. Even in the heady days following the liberal Orange Revolution of 2004 and the election of Viktor Yuschenko as president with Tymoshenko as prime minister, Ukrainian politics remained rife with corruption, political rivalries, and general dysfunction. There are serious underlying problems in Ukrainian politics beyond one man or one party that need to be addressed if the country is truly to liberalize. Aside from this, there are problems with how the aftermath is being managed. The fact that Angela Merkel would reach out so prominently to Tymoshenko, whose career has been plagued with corruption and which began under the wing of former authoritarian president Leonid Kuchma, is a worrying development. Her release is likely to be welcomed by many, but her return to power may prove to be highly controversial, as the entirety of the political structure became tainted with disenchantment in the years following the Orange Revolution to include the Fatherland party. At any rate, Tymoshenko does not enjoy significant support in the eastern half of the country, and thus is not likely to be the figure to unite the people of Ukraine, as Merkel has urged.

Indeed it is the eastern half of the country that the EU and US negotiators need to consider in this situation. Russian has been downgraded as a language from its co-official status with Ukrainian, though nearly 40% of Ukrainians speak Russian at home, which may seem an insignificant point, but in actuality highly symbolic as evidenced by its status on Yanukovych’s political platform in 2010, along with other references to Russian ethnicity and unity which play well in the east and Crimea where many align themselves as ethnically Russian. There are other trappings of western-leaning nationalist symbolism which many are not likely to welcome. The highly nationalistic opposition figures have found much less traction in the east than the west. If it seems that the east v. west point is being played up too much, it is not; there exists a very real and tangible separation within the country between nationalist Ukrainians and those that identify with Russia. What is more, the Party of Regions (Yanukovych’s party), whose stronghold Is in these predominantly Russian-leaning parts of the country, has remained fairly intact in the immediate aftermath. Though it now publicly disavows former President Yanukovych and much of his cabinet, in reality there are still more who adhere to the ‘Russian model’ of politics. And of course this tendency is not limited to one party only. It is for this reason that many Ukrainian protesters are demanding a complete change in Ukraine’s political composition, and that Klitschko has told his supporters to stay in the streets.

All of this is of course not to mention Russia’s involvement in the situation. Russia’s economic power, primarily supported through energy exports much of which travels through Ukraine on its way to Western Europe, makes playing geopolitical games with its authoritarian government very difficult. Ukraine of course turned down an EU deal for a Russian loan, and while the EU is likely to substitute for or better the offer of Russia, the Ukraine will remain deeply in debt to Moscow. One only has to look at the numerous gas shutoffs, affecting many living in poverty in Central and even Western Europe, to see that this debt is very tangibly manipulated. The Ukraine would likely require a substantial IMF loan to adopt a role as a true negotiator with Russia, which has yet to be offered. Russia will also certainly see the EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine as an affront to their interests, explaining its current refusal to bargain in the aftermath and all else that that entails.

In short, the revolution, if it is to be successful, will require both substantial change from within and substantial support from without. Mr. Klitschko is right to tell people to stay in the streets. There is much yet to unfold, and is not at all certain that the hope of liberalization will not fade away as it did in 2004. Though much is different, much remains the same.