The US and the EU: The Need for a United Front Against Russia

Transatlantic Tensions
“F**k the EU.” This is what Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland (the highest ranking diplomat in European relations) supposedly was overheard saying to the Ukrainian ambassador this February, while she was in a discussion concerning who should be the new head of state in Ukraine (representing another nasty little tendency of the American government). Ever since the resignation of Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright, transatlantic relations have grown tense. A brief period of solidarity after September 11 was quickly broken by disagreements over the war in Iraq, a wound which has never fully healed. It is not necessary to describe former president G.W. Bush’s attitude towards the EU, and really Europe in general. The Bush administration was a model of all the negative traits of US imperialist foreign policy. With the election of President Obama, who emphasized the need for multilateralism in international politics, many European and EU officials hoped that the process would be reversed and the transatlantic partnership infused with new blood. Such hopes have long since been dashed. Many officials have informally recounted how the president dislikes meeting with the officials in Brussels, having skipped the EU capital during his last four visits to Europe, and the turn towards a Pacific-based foreign policy has left many European leaders feeling that the US simply does not care about Europe anymore. They’re not far off, really. The president has officially stated on a number of occasions the need to shift foreign policy focus to China and the Pacific Rim. In the leadership vacuum left in Europe by US foreign policy, Germany has appeared to emerge as the new agenda-setter, even though this does not go over well in many member-states of the EU. It is doubtful that the transatlantic partnership will ever regain the importance it held during the Cold War era, and this is something that European officials will have to get used to. However, America still needs Europe, just as Europe needs America. The EU bloc is America’s largest trading partner, and consists of its strongest and most dependable strategic allies. The tensions, though they will probably never be resolved in the foreseeable future, need to be addressed by officials on both sides of the Atlantic.
Why America Needs the EU in the Ukrainian Crisis
Let us count the ways. To begin with, was it not a deal proposed by the European Union, rejected by then-president Yanukovych, that started the entire Euromaidan protest movement in the first place? Ukraine sees the EU as a more available and more responsive entity than the United States, and while anti-Americanism runs strong throughout the nation, the EU is much more well-regarded. The pro-Western elites, groups, and peoples of Ukraine see accession to the European Union as the ultimate goal of their country – one which will bring security, stability, and economic prosperity. Further, Ukrainians remember well the efforts put into rebuilding the former Warsaw Pact nations by the European Union officials at the time, where the United States was notably absent. Ambitions to join NATO are much less pronounced, and the US has never offered any substantial trade deals to the nation. In fact, it has hardly taken notice of the country until the escalation of violence in Kiev this January.
But now, one may say, a new government is in Kiev. The trade deal, and then some, has already been committed to by the EU. Now there is Crimea to worry about. And what exactly will the European Union, the same EU that seemed so helpless in the Yugoslavian disaster of the 1990’s, do about it? This is a valid question, yet it can still be answered without changing the premise of this article. However, we must break the responses up into several key points.
First: the military threat. Is it not, one may ask, that Russia is sending massive amounts of troops near the border with eastern Ukraine? And does it not remain the fact that NATO is, essentially, the US army with some scattered and very limited support from a smattering of allies? Thus, is it not the United States, and not the European Union, that will have to face any military threat coming from Russia? This is indeed true (and American officials have for years expressed frustration with Europe’s lack of contribution to the alliance). It is mainly US forces conducting exercises in Bulgaria and the Black Sea and sending air support to Poland and the Baltic States. This show of strength is doubtless important to limit the effect on Putin’s popularity created by his military buildup. But, while the future is unpredictable, it is an extremely unlikely scenario in which the first confrontation between NATO and Russia will occur over the Ukraine. It is also unlikely that Russia will actually invade eastern Ukraine – as I have stated in an earlier article, it is one thing to absorb a territory which has openly expressed its desire to join with the Russian Federation through referendum (whether legal or illegal under international law, it still retains trappings of democracy). It is quite another to militarily invade a portion of Ukraine which has expressed no such overwhelming desire, where many Ukrainians, while favoring close ties to Moscow, retain their national identities, and where even violent protests have seemed to have failed to bring about a change of heart for many eastern Ukrainians.
And what of Transnistria (Trans-Dniester), the breakaway province in Moldova? Two questions: first, is the Russian army really going to violate the sovereign territory of Ukraine to reach that destination? And second, why does the Russian army need to invade this region when nearly 1,000 Russian ‘peacekeepers’ are already stationed there, and have been for some time? This is merely one analyst’s opinion, but I believe that the military threat is being grossly exaggerated, and that Putin’s military buildup is more of a publicity stunt than anything else. And, without a military threat, you do not need NATO and the backing of the United States. NATO will most likely play the same role it has since the end of the Cold War: a symbolic one.
Second, the economic sanctions. The main claim of US officials is that, while the EU is targeting individuals, the US is going after large assets like the Bank Russiya. And that is certainly helpful. But, much like any wealthy American businessman, Russian economic elites are savvy enough to shelter their wealth elsewhere (primarily in Cyprus, a notorious tax haven for Russians, which just so happens to be in the European Union). The EU is targeting individuals who shelter their wealth in European micro-states, who educate their children in Britain, who vacation in Monte Carlo and the French Riviera, and who invest in Eastern Europe. It may be argued that the EU sanctions have a greater possibility of impacting the elites of the Putin administration than the Americans’. At the very least, it cannot be said, as some US officials have, that the EU sanctions are ‘worthless.’
This initial round of sanctions will necessarily need to be followed by further economic sanctions, as Russia is not now nor ever has been swayed by arguments based upon international law. Russia functions under a ‘realist’ vision of politics, where state power, and its constant increase, is the primary measure of success in geopolitics. In producing further sanctions, the role of the European Union will be indispensable.

Consider the facts. In the year 2012, Russia traded 287.5b euro worth of commodities to the EU bloc, compared to 18.8b euro worth to the United States (representing just over 7% of Russia’s trade with the EU). Beyond this, the EU bloc represents the number one market for Russian energy exports, which, as is common knowledge, is the blood in Russia’s veins. Russia prefers to, and in this instance will probably try to, negotiate deals with individual member-states to help get around EU-level sanctions. However, over the years the officials in Brussels have achieved considerable control over the macroeconomic mechanisms of its member states. It sets tariff rates for all commodities imported into or exported from EU member-states. It sets rules and regulations, often quite stringent, on the kinds of commodities, and in what quantities, can be imported into the bloc. It has the power to create (or restrict) official subsidies to corporations, including those founded by foreign direct investment. And, of course, it sets the monetary exchange between the euro and all other internationally traded currencies, including the ruble. Should the officials in Brussels be so inclined, they have the power to enact significant sanctions against Russia that will effectively and directly hit an economy that is already purportedly slipping into recession.
A United Front
The problem with this reasoning is, though, that if the European Union enacts sanctions that are too stringent, it will amount to a Pyrrhic victory. The Eurozone itself is still suffering a severe recession, unemployment remains high, GDP production is slow, and, frankly, any measures that would affect the Eurozone economy too harshly will end disastrously. Hence the cautious course taken by diplomats in Brussels, targeting individuals in Russia’s inner circle rather than the economy from which they derive their wealth. It is here that the United States must re-enter the discussion. Although the US economy has clearly not recovered either, it is certainly stronger than Europe’s. In addition, as previously noted, the United States does not have nearly as close a connection to the Russian economy as the EU. If the US is really serious about economic sanctions that will reverse the trajectory Russia seems to be on, what is needed is a reconsideration of trade negotiations with the EU bloc, negotiations that will be more favorable to the European economies to alleviate some of the effects that decreased trade with Russia will create. If the US is serious about confronting Russia, than it needs to take the EU seriously, and it needs to support and encourage its transatlantic ally in taking difficult and unpopular measures. The transatlantic relationship must come center stage in any discussion about confronting Russia, and not just for photo-ops. If the US and the EU are both serious about the Crimea issue, then both need to take each other seriously, and rely on the longstanding partnership whose sole raison d’être for nearly 50 years was restraining Russian imperialism. Neither can solve this problem alone.

After Crimea, What’s Next?

Sunset on Crimea

On March 18th, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill into law formally annexing the territory of Crimea, a southern peninsula of Ukraine, incorporating it officially into the Russian Federation. The move has been described as illegal under international law by Ukraine and a number of Western countries as well as the European Union as a collective entity. However, legal contestation does not change the facts on the ground. As of yesterday, every military base in Crimea was under Russian occupation, and the central government in Kiev has ordered the immediate evacuation of all Ukrainian troops. The status of the maneuver will likely be debated long after its actual incorporation into Russia, but the questions today primarily concern how effective counter-measures may be imposed, and what Russia will do next.
Sanctions
The most basic strategic tool used in legal battles over international law, sanctions, have already been employed by Western nations. Some major sanctions have been put into effect, including those targeting Bank Rossiya (the Kremlin’s favored bank) and Russia’s exclusion from the G-8 summit, but for the most part they have been targeted against individuals among Putin’s inner circle. At last count, the United States had imposed sanctions, including travel restrictions and asset freezes, against 27 individuals; the European Union has targeted 33. These individuals comprise Putin’s inner circle, including his Chief of Staff, the mastermind of Putin’s model of ‘managed democracy,’ business partners, and childhood friends. The strategy behind such sanctions is widely recognized in political studies: through targeting individuals surrounding an authoritarian leader (as Putin can at this point be safely called), the hope is to trigger ‘elite defection,’ with their inner circle withdrawing their necessary support as it no longer suits their interests. However, these sanctions will not be nearly enough to trigger such an occurrence. What is more, Putin has a fairly legitimate base of popular support to rely upon in any event, which increases with each imperial maneuver such as the one under discussion here. Western economic sanctions will, in fact, never go far enough to have much of a restraining effect on Russian geopolitical ambitions. Russia is the European Union’s largest trading partner, is slated by the IMF to represent the 7th largest gross national producer (GNP) by 2015 (just below France and the UK), and the global economy is already feeling the effects, beginning with a sharp rise in oil prices last week. Further, it may be argued that the West cannot present a united front: the European Union trades as a collective entity, and US President Barack Obama has all but avoided dealing with any EU officials even on this matter. And there are always other markets, such as China, who are less concerned with a state’s status under international law than what they have to offer. There is also the little inconvenient problem of Ukraine’s gross amount of debt to the Russian Federation, unlikely to decrease as a factor even with an influx of foreign aid. In short, sanctions, while they certainly send a clear diplomatic message, are not likely to have any geopolitical impact.
Military Drills
To bolster what should only assumed to be diplomatic messages, NATO forces have been active on their eastern borders in response to an intense buildup of Russian forces by the eastern Ukrainian border. A fleet of F-16 fighter jets have been deployed to Poland, spy plane activities have increased, and air support has been provided in the Baltic States as well. NATO has been conducting military drills both in Bulgaria and in the Black Sea in a symbolic gesture. None of this should be taken too seriously: there is virtually no possibility of US ‘boots on the ground’ in the Ukraine and, unfortunately, the nation is simply not strategic enough to trigger any significant military confrontation. On the alternate side, however, the Russian buildup near the eastern Ukrainian border should likewise be seen as a demonstration of forces, a flexing of muscles as it were. There is nothing to suggest a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, as some reporters have suggested. One must remember both that Crimea passed an overwhelming referendum prior to the Russian annexation, and that the Russians already had a substantial military force operating in the peninsula under a treaty giving them access to Black Sea ports and naval bases that has been in force since the 90’s.
The Russian Reaction
The Crimea incident has already spurred copycat protests in eastern Ukraine, and new fears are developing that Russia will attempt to occupy the Transnistria (also known as Trans-Dniester) region of Moldova, a breakaway province that has desired unification with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. As to the former, most eastern Ukrainians, although they feel an ethnic identification with the Russian heritage, do not seem to favor political unification. These are not Russians living abroad, as in Crimea, but national Ukrainians, many of whom value their national identity. As to the latter, it should be recognized that, after a series of conflicts in the Transnistria region, Russian ‘peacekeepers’ have been de facto occupying the territory for many years, which has its own government, insignia, and militia (as well as language dialect). Were Russia to formally occupy Transnistria, the occasion would have relatively little political impact apart from increasing Putin’s popularity at home. Of course, this is exactly the reason why such an occurrence should not be ruled out. After an amazing economic expansion in the 2000’s, the Russian economy is slowing down – in its fourth year of decline (with a growth of 1.3-1.5% of GDP – 3% is considered a stable and healthy growth rate). There is talk of a recession within the country. Political dissent is on the increase, occasioning extreme reprisals from the state authorities. Putin needs to bolster his political position at home, even at the expense of weakening it abroad. However, his recent imperialist actions and rhetoric have won great popularity in a nation still largely resenting the loss of world power occasioned by the collapse of the USSR – a recent poll suggested that more Russians than in the past 15 years believe that “Russia is a great power,” the figure standing at roughly 63%. Further, the Crimea situation has found popular favor, with roughly 95% of Russians (according to one poll) favoring “support of ethnic Russians living in Crimea,” from which it is not difficult to draw a justification for annexation in a majority-Russian territory. In reality, the Russian play is no different than it has been for centuries: in times of domestic troubles, imperialist ventures abroad draw attention away and reinforce the existing regime. This was true under the Romanovs, it was true under the USSR, and it has been true since the 1990’s (see Russia’s support in the Yugoslav breakup or its establishment of essentially protectorates in Georgia in 2008). It is a tried and true method, and for a Soviet-reminiscent strongman such as Putin it would be counterintuitive to expect any less. And it seems to be working, at least for the time being. This leaves commentators with the question, what steps will Russia take next?
Putin’s Strategy
Following the annexation, President Putin made a formal address to the state assembly. He put the annexation of Crimea into terms of a ‘reunification’ with Russia, a correction of a historical injustice that he described as a cheap power play by former Premier Nikita Khrushchev in a move that was unconstitutional even under Soviet standards. He played upon the issues with the Kiev government and how it was unfit to govern the peninsula, focusing on corruption and the official reduction of the Russian language to explain the increasing alienation of Crimea from the mainland. He compared the referendum to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, declared legal by the UN’s International Court of Justice, despite the complete absence of discrimination against Russians in Crimea and the existence of an extensive network of laws, rules, and regulations to guarantee the essential political autonomy of the region under the Kiev government (all contrary to the factors upon which the ICJ ruled Kosovo’s declaration legal under international law). He even compared the annexation to the reunification of East and West Germany (despite the fact that only 66% of Crimeans are ethnically Russian). Overall, however, he played upon the incompetence and possible illegality of the interim government of Ukraine, giving the impression that the people of Crimea were now in better hands. He stated in his address that: “it is obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the imposters, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.” Vladimir Putin is thus following the grand tradition of imperialist political theatre in every sense of the word.
What Next?
To begin with, eastern Ukrainians have little to fear (or hope for) despite Russia’s buildup along the border. It is one thing to accept an overwhelming referendum as grounds for annexation, quite another to militarily invade a sovereign nation where no such vote has occurred (nor is it likely to). The military buildup is most likely just a flex of strength, a compliment to the imperialist tactics Putin is employing, to bolster support at home. Further, eastern Ukraine does not have anywhere near the military and economic strategic significance of the Crimean peninsula, which has been battled over for centuries. It is true we are likely to see more pro-Russian protests in Ukraine, perhaps violent ones, but probably not serious enough to completely reverse the results of the revolution in Kiev. As for Transnistria, therein lies a different scenario. It is possible that Putin would consider sending troops or escalating diplomatic talks with this breakaway province, riding out an approval rating high starting with Sochi and continued through Crimea, to detract from looming domestic problems. Yet again, this would be an event of relatively little geopolitical significance. Transnistria already functions in practical way independently of its host country of Moldova, which is not a NATO ally (and has little chance of being one) and is in no way strategically important. Even were a Russian occupation to take place, it would change very little on the ground. Most likely, what comes next is a battle of rhetoric, a legal battle in which Putin will attempt by any means (including referencing the United States’ own violations of international law) to defend his decisions in the international community, perhaps loosing European Union sanctions, and an economic battle with the West that is sure to affect both sides in a negative way. This commentator can only make limited predictions. But, most likely, the bloodless invasion of Crimea marks the high point of the Russian geopolitical drama for the moment. We should be focused on Crimea, and on the effect it will have on the still fragile interim government of Ukraine, above all other things.

Putin’s Post-Sochi Persecutions

For the love of sport. Olympians this year refrained from making any commentary on the human rights travesties which were, are, and will continue to be normal routine in their host country of Russia. The highest pinnacle of athletic achievement must not be sullied by mere politics, by people’s living conditions, by issues of civil, political and human rights – the games shall exist in a world unto itself, shielded from the goings-on in the world surrounding them. Problem is, the Olympics did not take place in some special, insulated bubble. They took place in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And whether or not it would have made any difference, it is fair to question the conventional wisdom of this tradition when the country’s authoritarian leader receives the largest boost in approval ratings of his (third) presidency, its highest point since his (re-)inauguration in May of 2012. The figure now hovers at 67%, which is probably a fairly reliable figure. Loathe as the West is to admit it, there is very real support from a large cross-section of the Russian people for Vladimir Putin, the man that restored Russia to greatness after the debacle following the fall of the Soviet Union. For many, Putin brought strength where there was weakness, brought order where there was chaos, and put Russia back to work (unemployment dropped dramatically in the 2000’s) exploiting its natural resources, where before there was only financial ruin or mafia capitalism. Yet we all know the price of these ‘authoritarian goods.’ With his popular approval back on the upswing, and international attention deflected for the moment by the release of Pussy Riot and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the 14-year ruler is back to the old modus operandi of domestic political persecutions.

Almost without missing a beat, a trial of eight protesters from Putin’s May 2012 inauguration resumed the week after Sochi. Given the structuring of the Russian judicial system, it is only a matter of how severe the penalty for “mass rioting” will be: for Pussy Riot, it involved a trip to Siberia, and they are by no means the only victims of such politicized justice of late (indeed, they embrace their status as only a representative of many). Khodorkovsky, of course, was an old rival, released now when he has been broken down and made harmless: bankrupt, unwelcome in Russia, blocked from both industry and politics in his home country, and probably fearful of a fresh political charge (fearful enough to have left the country at the earliest opportunity). Putin no longer has any real rivals. Persecutions these days are more about maintaining ‘public order,’ the cornerstone of any authoritarian government. Charges like mass rioting or disturbing the peace are carried forward into the bowels of Russia’s inquisitorial judicial system.

How it works is this. Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, a ‘vertical of power’ has been established over local and regional governors and legislatures, who must report to presidentially-appointed plenipotentiaries, who have the power to dismiss these figures and entities. With legislation and administration brought under the control of the federal executive in this manner, the way is cleared for the courts to function as a subsidiarity of the executive branch. Through the Russian ‘Procuracy,’ the highest legal authority in the country, judges are appointed at all levels of government. Though the office of the procuracy is filled by the federal council, Putin’s inheritance of the one-party model of governance ensures that that position will always be filled by a subordinate owing direct allegiance to the head of the party (who at times has been Putin himself, and at other times chosen by him). Thus the presidential administration in effect maintains control over all levels of the court system. It is noteworthy that since 2000 the procuracy has never solved a case of political assassination or major financial crime, apart from the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Add to this that the Russian court system uses an inquisitorial model, meaning there is no trial by jury and all matters are decided by the judge. In addition, the investigating prosecutor is given free rein to unwarranted search and seizure, interrogations, and the ability to detain suspects for up to 48 hours, completely at their discretion. What all of this means in practice is that the guilty verdict for political opponents is never in doubt – the only uncertainties are the severity of the sentencing and the amount of harassment the friends and loved ones of the accused will be subjected to. This is intended to create a culture of fear among political opponents.

With his recent boost in popularity and all of these techniques at his disposal, President Putin is sure to engage in a fresh round of political persecutions, particularly as international attention has shifted from events in Russia for the moment. Nonetheless, this is an issue that those that value civil, political, and human rights should pay attention to. The message here: don’t forget about Russia so quickly.