Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine – full text

Euromaidan PR

The deal was hammered out in Ukraine’s presidential palace during overnight talks. Photograph: Thomas Trutschel/Photothek via Getty Images

The full text of the deal signed by Ukraine’s opposition leaders and President Viktor Yanukovych, released by Germany’s foreign ministry

Concerned with the tragic loss of life in Ukraine, seeking an immediate end of bloodshed and determined to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, We, the signing parties, have agreed upon the following:

1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

3. Presidential elections…

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Violence on the Maidan: Ukraine’s Revolution Escalates

Developments in Ukraine have been rapidly escalating in the past few weeks. At the New Year, the opposition drew a gigantic rally in Independence Square. In late January, protests turned violent as Molotov cocktails and burning tires from the protesters were exchanged for rubber bullets and tear gas from the riot police. Since, several important members of the president’s cabinet have stepped down, numerous official buildings, including the city hall of Kiev, have been occupied by the protesters, and certain factions among the opposition have begun to militarize in the event that a peaceful solution cannot be reached. This week, however, things turned from bad to worse, as violence on a significant scale finally erupted onto this tense scene. On Tuesday, an estimated 26 people were killed, mainly from live rounds. Following a short truce which was quickly broken, the death toll now stands at over 50 people, with hundreds more injured. There are reports of live rounds and petrol bombs being used in Independence Square, the locus of the opposition movement, and President Yanukovych, in a move that may signal an inclination towards military repression, has abruptly replaced the head of the army with a new commander that has promised the introduction of new ‘anti-terror’ tactics. On the opposition side, there are reports that some militias are attempting to seize weapons, and military security has been increased at munitions sites. Many government buildings have been evacuated for fear of opposition occupation.

For those unaware of the origins of this conflict, they began in November of last year. Ukraine was slated to sign an association agreement with the European Union as part of the EU’s broader Eastern Partnership initiative that would create a free trade regime between the entities, provide development aid for Ukrainian infrastructure, encourage approximation of regulation to European Union economic legislation (thereby facilitating more trade), provide access to EU funding mechanisms including the European Bank for Economic Redevelopment, and eventually allow for visa-free travel between the nation and EU member-states (a hugely popular measure with many western Ukrainians). Russia, however, is wary of Ukraine integrating further with Europe. Russia wishes to expand its own free trade area, the Commonwealth of Independent States (made up of former Soviet republics), and is particularly jealous of its energy transit rights through the country as the central pipeline for product destined for Western Europe, an important energy market for Russia. There is doubtless also some generalized apprehension in the Kremlin about Ukraine straying too far to the west, mirrored also in its staunch objection to Ukrainian NATO membership. Thus, to discourage Ukrainian politicians from taking the EU deal, the Russians offered their own economic incentive instead, which included a virtually no-strings bailout loan and extremely favorable prices for oil and natural gas, appealing directly to the economic elite of the country. This, in addition to a natural inclination towards closer Russian relations on the part of Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and much of eastern Ukraine generally, helped tipped the balance away from the EU deal, which was eventually rejected.

However, greater European integration is a salient political issue in the western half of the Ukraine, where it is associated with adopting the vestiges of nationalism (rather than a continuation of the ‘yoke of Moscow’), economic gain, greater international respectability, and modernization. So, unsurprisingly, there was a large reaction to President Yanukovych’s U-turn away from the EU deal. Crowds came out in large numbers to Kiev’s Maidan (Independence Square), famous protest site of the 2004 Orange Revolution, to demonstrate against the decision. It began much as the 2004 Orange Revolution had, with peaceful non-violent sit-ins and demonstrations, following the ‘occupy’ model of protest. After several weeks without any sign of concessions from the authorities, however, some of the demonstrators grew frustrated. Insults and stone-throwing soon evolved into shooting fireworks and throwing burning tires at riot police, which was met in return with barrages of rubber bullets. Then, in mid-January, the situation escalated exponentially after the bodies of two dead protesters were found in the snow and a prominent activist leader had gone missing. Exchanges in the square soon turned to Molotov cocktails and tear gas, and demonstrations spread across the country, particularly in the nationalistic (anti-Russian) west. An increasing amount of government buildings were being occupied by opposition factions, while on the other side reports of brutal police beatings began to surface. The situation has now come to a head with at least 50 people confirmed dead over the past week and looming indications of a resort to military repression.

The situation has many asking whether Ukraine could break out into civil war. The conditions are certainly present: a deeply divided society, a corrupt, ineffective governance structure, weak rule of law, unwillingness of external parties to intervene, and frustrations that have largely festered since the Orange Revolution and the disappointment that many found in that event. Yanukovych himself has shown no intention of stepping down, and indeed may be the least desirable person to have to negotiate such a delicate situation with, having been brought up in his political career by the politico-criminal mafia organizations that control much of the eastern half of the country. Visa bans by the United States and even asset freezes by the European Union are unlikely to produce any great effect, particularly with Russia remaining closely involved in the situation to further its own interests (which lie with a Russian-leaning, semi-authoritarian regime such as has existed for most of Ukraine’s independent history). Radical protesters are taking a cue from these signs and have begun to arm themselves in preparation for a conflict that some see as inevitable.

The West still hopes to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations, and has made no secret of its preference for Viktor Klitschsko, a champion of liberalism and the ideal of a ‘man of the people,’ to take Yanukovych’s place. However, not only is Klitschsko only one voice at the negotiating table which represents vastly different interests, the West’s structured negotiations leave out any party other than the ruling government which supports greater integration with Russia, a goal that nearly half the country shares. It is perhaps this population, badly represented through the governance apparatus and completely ignored by the opposition movement, which may represent the greatest threat to a settled negotiation. It is questionable how this population, already by definition distrustful of the West, would react to such a staunch and unapologetically western-leaning figure taking power from a Russian-leaning president who, in fact, was duly elected in free and fair elections monitored by numerous NGOs. This is a factor that must be considered before western nations should make any sort of intervention in the country. Another factor which must be considered is to what extent these opposition ‘leaders’ really speak for the people. Although the protests began as a single-issue movement, they have devolved into a general frustration with the state of politics in the country and attracted demonstrators from all varieties of political persuasion from pro-Western liberals to ultra-nationalist neo-fascists. In Ukraine, what we are seeing in its pure form is politics taken to the streets, and it is questionable whether any figure will be able to speak on behalf of demonstrators at this point. The negotiations may in fact for that reason prove fruitless.

The key question has become whether President Yanukovych will attempt to use the military to crack down on the demonstrations, and how the military would react to such orders. If the ruling oligarchs have the coercive capacity to realistically impose this measure, the demonstrations will doubtless fail in short order, although the result may yet be bloody. It would appear that Yanukovych has found the right man for the job, using the traditional ‘anti-terrorist’ justification for crackdowns on political demonstrations. For all its faults, Ukraine is both a key strategic ally for western powers and the linchpin of the European energy market. Although the conflict may easily escape one’s gaze, we can be sure that influential world leaders are taking the matter very seriously. Unfortunately, no substantial change can be effected from the outside: the Ukrainian people must come to terms with their own governance structure, however it may look after the conflict, before it they can engage in any meaningful external relations. Ukraine is experiencing a long-delayed conflict between an ever-more informed and engaged populace and a corrupt and dysfunctional governance structure, and while as much support as possible should be provided to reduce the bloodshed associated with such a conflict, ultimately it is a problem for the Ukrainians to solve. Yet Ukraine, if ever before, is worth paying attention to now.

Ukraine: Svoboda and Pravy Sektor

Radicalism in the Movement

This post will take a slight departure for timeliness’ sake, and identify two radical right-wing groups active in the protest movement in Ukraine. This perhaps makes these groups more dangerous, as the established order of government and society in Ukraine is already being threatened by the protest movement (and not without reason). While most in the movement call for more liberal policies and closer integration with the European Union, radical right-wing elements have gained substantial influence, calling for national preference, the development of an ultra-nationalistic state which will enforce ideals about racial discrimination, and an honoring of the Nazi collaboration government, which has become the Ukrainian right-wings version of an idealized historical past of an ethnically homogenous society. For this reason the topic fits well with this series on the radical right in Europe.

Right now in Ukraine the riots which began in November 2013 over a government decision to shun a closer relationship with the European Union in favor of strengthening ties with Russia (traditionally seen by Ukrainian nationalists and liberals as interfering in national affairs, not without reason) turned violent in late January 2014. Even before that point, the protest movement acquired a larger purpose than simply calls for greater European integration, as the streets of Kiev gradually became a place to voice general frustrations with the government, including its receptiveness to Russian influence, rampant corruption, and use of illiberal tactics such as imprisoning opposition leaders for political reasons. As frustration grew more general in Maidan Square (the central site of the protests), the movement quickly acquired a broad range of ideologies. Among the liberals, there developed stronger voices from ultra-nationalists and neo-fascist groups, which have quickly gained substantial influence. Members from these more radical groups tend to be more active in shooting fireworks and throwing Molotovs at riot police, as well as occupying government buildings. Some of these militias have become lethally armed. Whatever the outcome of the protest movement in Ukraine, these factions will have to be reckoned with to achieve any lasting conclusion. These groups can be placed into two groups: one, Svoboda, is a legitimate and serious political party, having 35 seats in the Ukrainian parliament and showing strong in many regions in the nationalistic west of the country; the other, Pravy Sektor (translating as ‘right sector’ after their place in the protest movement), is actually a grouping of roughly a dozen smaller groups varying significantly in their views, although ultra-nationalism is a common theme, and is defined by being the more radical elements of the protest movement.

Svoboda

*Original logo of the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine

Svoboda was founded in 1991, directly following Ukraine’s break away from the USSR, as the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, in explicit reference to Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism in Germany. For years it used explicit Nazi symbolism, such as its logo of the Wolfsangel, used by the Nazis as a symbol of the Aryan race. It looked back to the Nazi collaboration government as an idealized heritage of an ethnically pure and nationalistic society, prior to Ukraine’s subjugation by Russia (its traditional role in history). It formed a para-military arm, the Patriots of Ukraine, to carry out political activism. Yet much like France’s Front National, Svoboda eventually softened its stance to seek democratic representation. The Wolfsangel was replaced as the party logo, explicit reference to Nazi Germany was renounced, and its stance softened somewhat. It changed its name to “All Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ “ and officially split with the Patriots of Ukraine in 2004 (although the groups maintain close ties). Yet to this day, the party continues to idealize nationalist fascism, continues to make reference to the Nazi collaboration government as an exemplar of an idealized society, continues to be anti-Semitic and racially discriminatory, continues to preach national socialism as the ideal function of government. The Svoboda party today has 37 seats in the Ukrainian parliament after winning 10% of the popular vote in 2012 elections, and has strong showings in the traditionally nationalist western districts of the country (the party is viewed with enmity by the traditionally Russian-leading, Soviet reminiscent eastern half). Svoboda is a member of the European Alliance of National Movements, along with British National Party, France’s Front National, Jobbik in Hungary, and Belgium’s National Front.  The party has achieved a great amount of success largely due to its seizure on the issue of anti-corruption (a huge issue in Ukrainian politics) and anti-establishment nature, attracting many “protest votes.” Yet there are many who are deeply committed to its brand of extreme nationalism and national socialism.

Svoboda has been active in the Euromaidan protests since their beginnings in November 2013. The party has seized on the issue of anti-corruption, as it actually strongly opposes closer integration with the European Union. Its leader, Oleh Tyahnybok, is a key figure in the protest movement, and regularly appears alongside liberal leaders like Viktor Klitschko. Its former para-military arm, the Patriots of Ukraine, has been very active in the past few weeks as among the most militant of protesters, shooting fireworks and occupying government buildings. This neo-fascist, racist, and ultra-nationalistic party has become a serious presence in Ukraine’s protest movement, and has a seat at the negotiating table.

Pravy Sektor

There are some extremists who see Svoboda as too liberal and conformist. These groups have come under the banner of “Pravy Sektor,” or right sector, after their position in the Euromaidan protests. Like Svoboda, these groups have been active in the protests since their beginnings, yet are typically staunchly opposed to EU integration. These groups vary widely in their ideology and membership base, varying from soccer hooligans to veterans of the USSR’s Afghan War to militant activists of all different views. i embrace neo-fascism and racial purity. The Pravy Sektor comprises the most militant groups of protesters, some of whom have become lethally armed. Pravy Sektor is preparing for a revolution, for a complete shift in the social order. Militants under the label of Pravy Sektor are the most active in throwing Molotovs, burning tires, and other such objects at riot police, and were among the first to occupy government buildings. Groups under this label have become para-military in their operations, and are a serious presence in the protest movements, being primary driver of violence in Kiev and now across the western half of the country. These typically ultra-nationalist, racist, and in some cases explicitly neo-fascist groups, numbering at about a dozen, are, like Svoboda, a necessary force to consider in any envisioned ending of the protests.

Presence in the Revolution

The strains of ultra-nationalism, racism, national socialism, and neo-fascism represented by Svoboda and Pravy Sektor represent a serious presence in the protest movement and a serious threat to any liberal order envisioned by most of the protesters in the Euromaidan movement. Their positions in determining the outcome of any end to the movement is a serious consideration when looking at the Ukraine today. The significant presence of ultra-nationalist, neo-fascist, and racist ideology in the protest movement makes them worthy of examination and continued interest. These ideologies will necessarily play a role in determining a future for Ukraine after the protests. Svoboda and Pravy Sektor, more than most of the groups that will be examined in this series, is a threat to any liberal social order. Its active position in the development of a new social order makes it perhaps the most important groups to examine here.

Greece: Golden Dawn

The group “Golden Dawn,” functioning both as a political party and a broader social movement, achieved its first democratic breakthrough in 2012. The group moved from receiving just 0.2% of votes cast in the 2009 parliamentary elections to 7% in 2012. How did this group, which promotes its own brand of national socialism, gather so much attention and approval in the space of only three years? The economic crisis and bailout negotiations are doubtless the immediate causes. However, the ideological bases on which this group was founded run deep within modern Greek society.

Origins and Ideology

The leaders of the party now known as Golden Dawn trained as activists under the youth program of the National Political Union (EPEN) party in the 1970’s, whose nominal leader was Georgios Papadopoulos, the former dictator of Greece’s brutal military regime from 1967 to 1973. After the toppling of the regime and the imprisonment of Papadopoulos, EPEN formed to preserve the tradition of “Fatherland-Religion-Family,” a value system carried over in large part from the Nazi occupation government and preserved by right-wing groups since the end of the 1946-1947 civil war. This ideology largely collapsed as a political force along with the military junta in 1974. Yet it gained strength in the 1990’s and 2000’s, first through the National Party and later through the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) in the 2000’s. These parties focused on traditional issues of far-right parties in Europe, such as immigration and law-and-order, which are admittedly significant issues facing society with a foreign-born population of three times the European Union average, rampant corruption, and crime rates showing a 200% increase in robberies and a 67% increase in domestic burglaries in the space of three years (2007-2010) during the height of the global financial crisis [Eurostat link].

Democratic Breakthrough

Golden Dawn seems to be profiting from these issues, and from its ‘anti-establishment’ nature, winning a large share of voters from the collapse of LAOS (largely attributable to its approval of the bailout negotiations). A poll conducted in November 2013 found that one out of ten voters supported Golden Dawn, while one out of twelve would vote the party if elections were held next week. Golden Dawn has reacted to poor economic conditions by promoting its own brand of national (ethnic) socialism: hosting food kitchens (only for Greeks), blood banks (only for Greeks), and other such programs. There are even pictures of Golden Dawn members helping old women to ATM machines. But its other activities, which have gained alarming levels of popular support, include the forming of a para-military police force and organizing acts of violent crime against immigrations (to protect the public order). The recent murder of leftist rapper Pavlos Fyssas (“Killah P”) is only the most visible of the many crimes its members have committed over the past several years. Reliable statistics are difficult to come by, as many such crimes are never recorded by police, and sometimes are carried out with the tacit approval of police officers [link: HRW]. In hard economic times, racial scapegoating often represents a simple and attractive solution to social problems. The party has become a serious threat to Greek society.

Organization

Golden Dawn is primarily organized around independent cells taking direction from a centralized hierarchy, with the General-Secretary Nikos Michaloliakos (who founded the party in 1983 and is currently under indictment for running a criminal organization) at its head, with immense personal powers. The General Secretary can appoint and remove members of the Political Council, which oversees the party’s daily operations, completely at will. Further, a call for elections to choose a new leader must have an absolute majority of votes in this Council. The party’s primary support base, like most far-right parties in Europe, is “angry young men” – unemployed youth and first-time voters – some of whom staff the organization’s para-military force. The party tends to be successful in keeping these voters over the years. Support also comes from Greek voters angry about the bailout negotiations and the handling of the economic crisis, who are drawn by its anti-establishment nature. Many of these, no doubt, are ‘protest votes,’ with votes for the two major parties declining by over 50% during bailout negotiations from 2009 to 2012. Yet exit polls conducted in June 2012 still found that 48% of Golden Dawn voters felt “very close” to the party’s ideology. There are apparently many voters drawn by its national socialist agenda.

At the present, support for Golden Dawn among Greeks remains significant, with rising crime and immigration rates, paired with the extremity of the economic crisis, contributing to its ascendancy. Like all far-right parties in Europe, Golden Dawn is profiting from the suffering caused by the financial crisis. They have found fertile ground in economically paralyzed, debt-laden Greece, where unemployment stands at 27% and youth unemployment at 57% as of August 2013. Golden Dawn’s own brand of racially biased national socialism appeals to a significant portion of the Greek society. The party represents a serious threat to the established social order. With its continuing success, we are likely to see a steady increase in racially-based violent crime and intimidation. Yet Golden Dawn, while an extreme example, is not unique in Europe. Similar groups such as Jobbik in Hungary and Ataka in Bulgaria have formed para-military groups to organize hate crimes in the name of ‘public order,’ whereas groups in Western Europe more on racial intimidation and at times on their legislative influence to spread authoritarian racist ideology. Golden Dawn is, ultimately, only part and parcel of a greater threat that faces the whole of Europe. Golden Dawn is merely the most extreme, but not unique, exemplar

The Rise of the Extreme Right in Europe: An Introduction

In an earlier article I spoke of a search for a ‘European’ social identity (Feb. 3), transgressing the traditional nation-state, as a response to the globalization trends that threaten the European region particularly. These trends include the global mobility of capital, which is largely unregulated, which threatens Europe particularly due to its intricate economic interdependency, global migration trends which assail ethnically based traditions, amplified by the freedom of movement within the European Union and shifting demographic trends (i.e., the declining birth rate of European ethnicities), and the threats to security posed by international terrorism, which exploits both free movement and shifting demographics.

The search for a “European” social identity to serve as a cornerstone to construct a governance structure superseding the nation-state which may be better able to manage these difficulties might be called a ‘positive’ response to these issues.

However, since the fall of Communism and the entry into the digital age, a ‘negative’ response may be identified as well: a trend towards extreme nationalism, racial exclusion, and authoritarian ideals which has spread throughout the whole of Europe and increases in strength with each passing year. It has become impossible to ignore and marginalize such trends. To take just one example of their manifestation: the “shock of 21 April 2002” in France refers to a presidential race which saw the incumbent president Jacques Chirac competing in the second round of voting directly with François-Marie Le Pen. Le Pen heads the Front National party, and has been quoted as stating that Europeans are a superior race due to their focus on industriousness at the expense of unlimited sexuality. Even at this, Le Pen won 18% of the electorate in the final round of elections. Similar radical right-wing candidates and parties have achieved comparable success across Europe: it is definitely a cause for concern for those who value liberty, egalitarianism, and democratic representation.

Instead of looking to establish a flexible and open European identity, these groups have turned inwards, embracing ultra-nationalism and ethnic homogeneity as responses to ‘protect’ the vulnerable social classes from the negative effects of globalization. These groups vary widely in ideals and tactics, but an idealized vision of ethnic homogeneity as a remedy for the ills of globalization and a staunch rejection of multiculturalism are a central feature of these movements, which usually emphasize the fundamental inequality of human beings divided along racial lines. Instead of ‘looking outward’ to face globalization trends on the basis of coming to terms with multicultural, globalized societies, these groups are ‘looking inward’ to isolationist and exclusionary policies to preserve an idealized vision of a pure, uncorrupted, and prosperous ethnically homogenous society. Any threat to such a vision is regarded with extreme enmity, which will often lead to ethnic scapegoating, discrimination, and acts of violence against minorities.

And of course, to state the obvious, the Eurozone crisis has drastically increased the strength of these groups. The appeal of the radical right stems largely from its anti-establishment nature and claims to represent ‘the people.’ With the extreme left having largely been discredited by the failure of ‘real existing socialism,’ the poor, the marginalized, and the young populations of Europe who feel disenfranchised by the mainstream governance structure have turned to these groups seeking protection. Hence increasing immigration and economic recession/depression have driven many into the arms of these groups who play on popular fears by offering simple solutions to complex social problems. It is with this in mind that we shall first turn to the most dramatic recent example of radical right-wing success – the Golden Dawn party of Greece. Following a thorough examination of the sources, consolidation, and impact of this group’s growth in power, we shall move systematically through an examination of manifestations of the radical right in other European nations.

We will move from the fragile, newly established democracies of Eastern Europe, where the radical right is heavily dependent on social movements and political violence, to the ‘old’ democracies of Western Europe, where the influence of well-organized parties has been successful in shifting the debate in mainstream politics to the right as traditional conservative parties seek to win back disenfranchised voters. I hope that this series will be of interest to readers, and that they will recognize the importance of analyzing dangerous trends arising in response to the globalization process. We will begin in Greece, where extreme economic depression, longstanding corruption, and extensive non-European immigration has paved the way for the violent, extremist Golden Dawn party to achieve success.

In Search of a European Social Identity: A Model for Globalization Management?

Globalization. The number one buzzword for the young generation. Worldwide financial crises, stateless wars, boundless social connectivity: the world which the youth is inheriting is dominated by all the effects of the “G”-word. One could write countless volumes about the phenomena, as has indeed been done. Let us instead narrow our focus.

Why Europe?

When looking at how different regions are dealing with globalization trends, one can identify a particular effort to manage them in Europe. Indeed, this should not be surprising. The second smallest continent, filled with ethnicities, religions, traditions, histories, and languages of all varieties, hitherto confined and managed through use of the nation-state model, is particularly vulnerable to the loss of this control as a result of globalization trends. The European Union, once merely a tool of rational economic strategy has, for better or worse, become responsible for managing these trends. Yet the nation-state model has only proven effective by virtue of shared languages, values, beliefs, histories, traditions. Very few, if any, of these features exist at the European regional level. “Europe” is thus an entity in need of a social identity.

The Need for Identity

Why? Because it is increasingly becoming apparent that the nation-state model will not be sufficient to manage future societies. The case is extreme in Europe as European leaders have consciously chosen to efface national borders for the sake of economic competitiveness. The issues that face Europe are not unique to it, but have been exacerbated by the development of the European Union. The same economic interdependence that dragged Europe from the depths of depression during the latter half of the 20th century has turned from a blessing to a curse, as global capital becomes more mobile and now must be dealt with collectively by societies with very different economic traditions. Problems associated with global migration are exacerbated by the effacement of national borders via the Schengen Agreement. Transnational crime and terrorism is better able to spread throughout the continent for this same reason. And all of these issues must be dealt with currently through an immensely complex political process hampered by an extreme amalgamation of priorities, values, traditions, and beliefs. Much as some would wish to believe otherwise, no real system of international law for the region has been developed to manage these issues.

And how could it? The nation-state model and the concept of rights and liberties are inextricably bound to the fundamental political premise of a social pact. And without a unified society, such a pact can hardly be made. Europe may well be the testing ground for new methods to manage the issues globalization gives rise to. But for that to become more than a mere hope, and if the “rights regime” (the concept that society is comprised of individuals imbued with certain rights for which a government is necessary to protect them) is to be maintained as a political paradigm… in short, if the concept of the social pact is to be preserved, Europe is in need of a social identity.

Should the Social Pact be Salvaged?

But why, one may ask, should the social pact model be preserved? If commitment to national identity is receding, if borders are becoming meaningless, if, indeed, we are all merging into a global society, does this not call for a new political paradigm? Perhaps. Perhaps the Marxist utopia of disintegration of the individual into a single collective may eventually be realized. But this will not happen in our lifetime, nor our children’s, nor our grandchildren’s. At this point in time, the development of a truly globalized society is highly unlikely. Before the nation, the fiefdom, or even the city-state, human beings organized themselves into tribes. This is certainly a question for psychologists and philosophers, but it would appear that the very phenomena of consciousness creates a need to define oneself, one’s place in the world. And in defining something, one is necessarily creating an “other,” something to define oneself against (“I am this, which means that I am not that”). So we should be wary of the cosmopolitan vision of globalization, and instead focus on its practical implications.

Recognizing, then, that globalization will not create a unified society, we should instead focus on its concrete, visible effects. For a society, in its proper definition, to exist, there must be some form of governance, some set of collectively agreed upon system of beliefs. In light of the issues that Europe now faces, and that other regions accepting the social pact model will also come to face, a social identity is necessary, be it local, national, or regional. The best response to the concrete effects of globalization, to avoid a devastating refashioning of the world, is to adopt identities that go beyond the nation-state.

Social Identification in Europe

	“Very Attached”	“Fairly Attached”	“Not Very Attached”	“Not At All Attached”
Nation	51%	40%	7%	2%
Locality (City, Region, etc.)	49%	39%	9%	3%
European Union	8%	38%	37%	15%

*Data extracted from Standard Eurobarometer 77 / Spring 2012 – TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_citizen_en.pdf

How?

How would this be achieved, particularly in Europe, where national identities are so strongly embedded? Ask any European: an Englishman is an Englishman, a Frenchman a Frenchman, a Spaniard a Spaniard, etc. In fact, according to a poll conducted by the European Commission in 2012, only 8% of respondents felt “very attached” to the European Union, compared to 51% who felt “very attached” to their nation (a total of 46% of respondents felt very or fairly attached to the European Union, opposed to 91% who felt the same attachment to their nation).

There are thus far two major lines of thought for tackling this problem. One, most famously championed by one of the premier political philosophers of our age, Jurgen Habermas, is that there is a need to develop a shared worldview among Europeans. This can be accomplished through greater transnational dialogue, most likely through the development of a truly transnational mass media apparatus (being that the media, as aptly pointed out by Benedict Anderson 30 years ago, shapes our perspectives on what is important, selectively provides information, and in such fashion crafts our view of the world). With the development of transnational dialogue, Habermas argues, eventually the peoples of Europe will be able to agree on a certain set of concrete beliefs, to be enshrined in a “European Constitution.” Such a consensus would facilitate transnational governance without the hinderance of conflicting viewpoints. This is constructing a social identity ‘from below,’ through public deliberation and consensus.

The opposing view is what might be labeled unification ‘from above,’ championed by a leading European Union scholar, Simon Hix, among others. This line of thought posits that treaty revisions should be made to European Union treaties to support more partisan debate among EU officials. With the expansion of the EU into more facets of daily life, and a growing familiarity among its citizens of European Union politics, majoritarian politics of the style familiar to nations operating under representative governance will spur more media attention to these debates. Impositions must be made at the level of the political elite to spawn more media attention, which will thereby increase debate among national societies. As awareness of and the significance of these debates increase, national constituencies will pay more attention to “European” politics. As these populations become more invested in EU politics, transnational debate and discussion will necessarily increase. Politics will bind the EU member-states together, and will encourage more active participation in European-level politics. This will in turn increase the salience of European Union politics, forcing the varied populations of Europe to make real, informed decisions as to how to manage globalization trends. Shared commitment to a unified governance structure will force real decisions, rather than non-binding agreements and resolutions which have little impact on confronting the real challenges Europe now faces.

Significance

To return to the beginning, the question is, of course, “who cares?” The issue of developing a European social identity is important because Europe is likely to be the primary testing ground for responses to globalization trends. Fractured yet interdependent, nominally though not practically unified, undergoing drastic demographic shifts – all of these features make Europe particularly vulnerable to the globalization trends of globally mobile capital, migration, transnational crime and security issues, and information exchange. Europe already has a nominal, though underdeveloped, system of transnational law, which would seem to be the best means through which to manage globalization trends as a boon rather than a detriment. If the old nation-state model can be superseded by a more powerful, more flexible, and more efficacious system of governance, such results may be achieved. A search for a European social identity is a search for a new form of polity that is better suited to managing globalization trends than those that currently exist. Should the project fail, Europe will undoubtedly recede into division, depression, and irrelevance.

The Great Experiment

Europe is likely to be the great experiment in the process of searching for means to manage globalization trends in a positive way. It is for this reason that the search for a European social identity has significance that exceeds its regional boundaries. It is for this reason that the world should care about the fate of Europe.